2026 Supreme(Online)(MP) 3071
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Shankarsingh Mujalda – Appellant
Versus
The State Of Madhya Pradesh – Respondent
WP 1406/2014
Rekha Shrivastava,Advocate General
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE JAI KUMAR PILLAI ON THE 21TH OF JANUARY, 2026 WRIT PETITION No.1406 of 2014 SHANKAR SINGH MUJALDA Versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHER Appearance:
Ms. Rekha Shrivastava - learned counsel for the petitioner.
Ms. Swati Okhale – Government Advocate for respondent No.1 to 5/State.
Shri Ramesh Kumar Chandrawade, learned counsel for the respondent No.6.
O R D E R
The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, calling in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 30/11/2013 passed by respondent No.5, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No.6 has been allowed and the order dated 04/10/2010 has been quashed and the matter has been remanded for reconsideration.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the Gram Panchayat, Udaygarh, issued a notification dated 26/08/2010 inviting applications for appointment to the post of Panchayat Karmachari (Secretary). Pursuant to the aforesaid notification, the petitioner submitted his application along with requisite documents. On the basis of the applications received, an educational merit list was prepared by the Gram Panchayat followed by the final merit list marked as Exhibit P/8. As per the merit list, the petitioner was placed at Serial No.1, whereas respondent No.6 was placed at Serial No.4. On the basis of the said merit list, respondent No.2 issued an order dated 04/10/2010, declaring the petitioner as selected for appointment and placing Kumari Manjula Kunwar Singh Chauhan on the waiting list.
3. Consequent thereto, respondent No.3 issued an appointment order dated 05/10/2010, appointing the petitioner as Panchayat Secretary on an honorarium of Rs.3,200/- under Section 86(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj Act, 1993. The Collector, District Alirajpur, thereafter issued a notification dated 11/10/2010, notifying the petitioner as Secretary, followed by an order dated 21/10/2010 passed by the Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat, appointing him under Section 69 of the Act of 1993.
4. Respondent No.6, being aggrieved by the selection and appointment of the petitioner, preferred an appeal under Section 95 read with Rule 3 of the Panchayat Karmi Scheme, 1995 thereafter by the impugned order dated 30/11/2013 respondent No.5 allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No.6 quashing the order dated 04/10/2010 and remanded the matter for reconsideration. Aggrieved by which the petitioner has filed this writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, as the petitioner was selected strictly on the basis of merit in accordance with the notification dated 26/08/2010. It is contended that the notification merely provided for preference to Scheduled Tribe/OBC, women and handicapped candidates and did not authorize displacement of a more meritorious candidate by a less meritorious one. It is further submitted that the petitioner secured 67.2% marks, whereas respondent No.6 secured only 57.2% marks and therefore, the petitioner was rightly placed at Serial No.1 in the merit list. Learned counsel contends that respondent No.6 was neither selected nor placed in the waiting list and thus had no vested right to seek interference with the selection already finalized. It is also urged that the entire selection process was conducted in accordance with Rule 5 of the M.P. Panchayat Service (Service and Conditions of Service of Gram Panchayat Secretary) Rules, 2011 and without recording any cogent reason the Appellate Authority has mechanically set-aside the selection.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.6 submits that the merit list was prepared erroneously, as a more meritorious candidate was excluded on the ground of non-registration with the employment exchange, though such a condition was not stipulated in the advertisement. It is