IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIMANSHU JOSHI

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ON THE 13 OF FEBRUARY, 2026 MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 152 of 2013 M.P. PURVI VIDYUT VITRAN COMPANY Versus RAMNATH PATEL Appearance:

Shri O.P. Mishra - Advocate for applicant.

None for respondent.

ORDER The present application has been preferred under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking grant of leave to appeal against the judgment dated 03.09.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge (Electricity Act), Sagar in Special Electricity Case No.7/2007, whereby the respondent has been acquitted of the charge under Section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 24.12.2006 at about 12:00 PM, the inspection team of the applicant-company allegedly found the respondent drawing electricity unauthorizedly by directly connecting a loose wire to the L.T. line and operating a 3 H.P. motor pump without any valid electricity connection, thereby causing assessed loss of Rs.14,869/-. A complaint under Section 151 of the Electricity Act was instituted, cognizance was taken and the matter proceeded to trial.

3. The learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced by both sides, acquitted the respondent vide judgment dated 03.09.2012 holding that the prosecution failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt and that the evidence suffered from material infirmities.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the trial Court has erred in law and on facts in acquitting the respondent and that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. At the outset, it is apposite to delineate the settled legal position governing interference in an appeal against acquittal. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, the Hon'ble Supreme Court (reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415) has authoritatively held that though the appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence, it should not interfere with an order of acquittal unless the conclusions drawn by the Trial Court are perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly unreasonable. It was further held that where two views are reasonably possible, the view favouring the accused must be adopted.

7. The said principle has been reiterated in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10 SCC 450, wherein it has been held that the presumption of innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal and interference is justified only when the judgment of the trial Court is palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, or demonstrably unsustainable.

8. Similarly, in case of Hakeem Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 5 SCC 719, the Apex Court has held that if the view taken by the Trial Court is a "possible view" based on evidence on record, the High Court should not substitute its own opinion merely because another view is also possible.

9. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid pronouncements, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has minutely scrutinized the testimony of the prosecution. witnesses, including the inspection officer, and has recorded cogent reasons for discarding the prosecution version. The Trial Court has noticed absence of reliable independent corroboration, inconsistencies regarding seizure preparation of documents, and failure to conclusively establish conscious and exclusive involvement of the respondent in the alleged act of unauthorized abstraction of energy.

10. It is trite that in a criminal trial the burden squarely rests upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof. The impugned judgment reflects that the learned Trial Court has accorded due weight to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and has extended the benefit of doubt to the accused upon finding that the prosecution evidence did not inspire full confidence.

11. The grounds raised in th