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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:17508

1 MCC-137-2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT

th

ON THE 27 OF FEBRUARY, 2026

MISC. CIVIL CASE No. 137 of 2026

SHOBHA VAJPAI AND OTHERS

Versus

SMT. VIRAN BAI AND OTHERS

Appearance:

Shri Ashok Shah - Advocate for the applicants.

ORDER

Heard on I.A.No.1470/2026, which is an application for condonation

of delay of 4405 days in filing the present application.

2. Present application has been filed for restoration of Second Appeal

No.1216/2012, which was dismissed for non-compliance of peremptory

order dated 31.10.2013.

3. It is submitted by counsel for the applicant that the applicants were

not aware about dismissal of their appeal due to which application could not

be filed within time. It is further submitted that in the appeal notices were

not issued and it was dismissed at motion stage but the counsel of appellant

did not informed them, hence there is no default on the part of appellants and

they should not suffer due to mistake of the counsel.

4. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the record.

5. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs.

Ramkumar Choudhary 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, has held as under :

Signature Not Verified

Signed by: ANAND KRISHNA

SEN

Signing time: 28-02-2026

11:52:08

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:17508

2 MCC-137-2026

"5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)

through his legal heir, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a

member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in

unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be

excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice

is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant

passage of the same is profitably extracted below:

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that

we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as

we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for

condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a

State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross

delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the

court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the

relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say

that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay

being condoned. This litigation between the parties started

sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed.

However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the

fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone

the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the

respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the

court must take into consideration while considering whether the

delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach

of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period

of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law

has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party

has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because

of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-

deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot

be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be

preferred as against the technical considerations. While

considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not

start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to

first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the

party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause

assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is

equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the

matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely