IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT GWALIOR BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE HIRDESH

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ON THE 24 OF FEBRUARY, 2026 MISC. APPEAL No. 2324 of 2018 UPENDRA SINGH PARIHAR Versus RAMNIWAS SINGH AND OTHERS Appearance:

Shri Avadhesh Parashar - Advocate for appellant.

Shri Kamal S. Rochlani- Advocate for respondent No.3/ Insurance Company.

ORDER The instant miscellaneous appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been preferred by appellant-claimant against the Award dated 09-03-2017 passed by Second Additional to the Court of First Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gwalior, in Claim Case No.56 of 2014, seeking enhancement of compensation amount.

2. Along with the appeal, the appellant has filed I.A. No.2349 of 2018, which is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of a delay of 331 days (as per office note) in filing the appeal.

3. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned award was passed on 09-03-2017, but the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed 90-day period due to financial constraints and the inability to pay the requisite court fees. It is further submitted that the appellant is ignorant of the law and, despite instructing the counsel, the appeal was only presented on 04-05-2018. The appellant claims that the delay is bona fide and based on genuine grounds, and thus, in the interest of justice, the delay of 331 days should be condoned.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for Insurance Company vehemently opposed the application for condonation of delay. It is submitted that the reasons assigned by the appellant are vague and do not constitute "sufficient cause" as required under the law. It is argued that financial hardship or ignorance of law cannot be used as a ground to bypass the statutory period of limitation, especially when the delay is as substantial as

331 days.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, this Court finds that the explanation offered for the delay is highly unsatisfactory. The law is well-settled that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner must show "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal within the limitation period. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that while a liberal approach may be adopted, it cannot be employed to exhibit institutional anxiety to condone every delay, particularly where there is a lack of bona fides or gross negligence.

6. Similarly, in the case of Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd. [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it was observed by Hon'ble Apex Court that the claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in the absence of even a basic explanation which can be construed as sufficient cause.

7. In the present case, the plea of financial hardship and ignorance of law is not supported by any cogent evidence. The appellant has failed to explain the day-to-day delay, and the reasons provided are stereotypical and lack substance. Acceptance of such grounds would render the statutory provisions of limitation redundant.

8. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the appellant has failed to establish sufficient cause for the condonation of 331 days of delay. Consequently, I.A.No.2349 of 2018 is dismissed. As the application for condonation of delay is rejected, the miscellaneous appeal also stands dismissed as barred by limitation. No order as to costs.

(HIRDESH)

JUDGE *VJ*