IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR FA No. 542 of 2017 (THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS Vs RAMDAS )

Dated : 17-02-2026 Shri R.K. Kesharwani - G.A. for the appellant/State.

None for the respondents despite service of notice.

Heard on I.A. No.10543/2017, an application for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal.

It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant/State that the Reference Court has passed an award on 03.03.2016. Thereafter, the opinion of the Government Advocate was sought on 21.01.2017 and permission has been sought vide proposal dated 25.06.2017 which was received on 29.06.2017. Thereafter, OIC was appointed on 10.07.2017. It is submitted that the permission was granted to file the appeal before the Indore Bench. However, as the territorial jurisdiction lies with this Court, again permission was granted to file the first appeal before the Principal Seat at Jabalpur and thus, the delay caused is based on bonafide. It is further submitted that additional affidavit to explain the delay has also been filed.

From perusal of the record it is found that the certified copy of the impugned award/judgment was applied on 22.07.2017 and the same was received on 27.07.2017 and thereafter, the appeal was filed on 31.07.2017. The impugned judgment/award was passed on 03.03.2016 and the appeal was filed with a delay of 418 days. As it is submitted in the application that the opinion was sought on 21.01.2017 thereafter, the proposal for permission was sought on 25.06.2017 which was received on 29.06.2017 and thereafter, the OIC was appointed on 10.07.2017.

The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani and others reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 in para-11 has held as under -

"11. ......... It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red- tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à- vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. ....."

The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and others reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 in paras - 8 to 15 has held as under -

"8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition preceden