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2026 Supreme(MP) 444

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
DEEPAK KHOT, J.
 
M/S Betul Town - Petitioner  
Versus 
The State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others – Respondents
Writ Petition No. 14843 of 2014 
Decided On : 06-05-2026
 

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Shri Yash Tiwari, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Smt. Vaaridhi Pathak Sharma, Panel Lawyer.

Unless expressly or impliedly barred by a special statute, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies for condonation of delay. Limitation bars the remedy but not the substantive right, and the State should not rely on technicalities to deny a legitimate refund.

Headnote:(A) Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Section 45(2) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Refund of excess stamp duty - Application filed beyond the three-month statutory period - Application rejected solely on grounds of limitation without considering merits - Setled principle that the expiry of a period of limitation prescribed under any law may bar the remedy but not the right - Where a statute does not contain any express or implied bar to the applicability of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply - The State, when dealing with a citizen, should not ordinarily rely on technicalities to deny a just claim and must act as an honest person. (Paras 8, 10, 11)

(B) Writ Jurisdiction - Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Court may treat a writ petition as an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act when the statutory authority lacks the power to condone such delay, ensuring that the State does not retain funds contrary to Constitutional principles. (Para 9)

Facts of the case:
A petitioner paid additional stamp duty on a sale deed which was subsequently found to be in excess. An application for refund was submitted after the three-month period prescribed under Section 45(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The authority rejected the application solely on the ground of limitation without examining the merits of the case.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the relevant statute does not provide any express bar on the application of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the benefit of condonation of delay as provided under the Limitation Act can be extended to the petitioner to ensure that the State is not unjustly benefited by funds for which the petitioner was not liable.

Issues: Whether the limitation period for refund of stamp duty under Section 45(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is absolute, or whether delay can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in the absence of an express bar.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of an express or implied bar in a special statute, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable. Moreover, while limitation may bar the remedy, it does not extinguish the substantive right to a refund.

Result: Petition allowed; impugned order quashed; delay condoned; matter remanded for decision on merits.

ORDER :

DEEPAK KHOT, J.

The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief:-

(i) to hold that the authority under section 45 (2)of Indian Stamp Act 1899 is a quasi judicial authority and is a court for the purposes of section 29 (2) of Limitation Act, 1963.

(ii) to set aside the order dated 04.04.2014 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Respondent no.3 and 4.

(iii) to remand the matter to the Respondent no. 3for affording opportunity to the present Petitioner to seek condonation of delay in terms of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.

(iv) to grant any other relief deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

(v) Cost of petition may be awarded.

2. In short, the facts of the case are that petitioner submitted a sale deed before the respondent no. 5 for registration and affixed the adequate stamp duty. However, the respondent no. 5 while examining the instrument came to the opinion that the instrument is not sufficiently stamped and, therefore, additional stamp duty was required to be deposited. Although the petitioner was orally communicated by the respondent No. 5 that if sufficient stamp duty is not affixed, the sale deed or register would not be attested, but the said information was communicated after a sufficient delay.

3. As averred in the petition, such sale deed was accordingly resubmitted for registration on 31.03.2013 after affixing additional stamp duty and thus the sale deed was registered and supplied to the petitioner on 02.04.2013 (Annexure P/2). However, later on, it came to the knowledge of the petitioner that subject land was within the limits of Gram Panchayat and not the Municipal Corporation, therefore, demand of additional stamp duty was improper and illegal, however, during the course of such process, it took some time. Thus an application for refund of such stamp duty was made on 30.08.2013 (Annexure P/3). Thereafter, respondent No.3 sought comments from respondent Nos. 4 and 5, which was communicated on 07.02.2014 (Annexure P/4), according to which, since the application was made beyond the period of three months as specified under Section 45(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short 'Act of 1899'), the same needs no consideration being beyond the period of limitation. Consequently, on the basis of the said opinion, the application for refund of the stamp duty has been rejected by the respondents by the impugned order dated 04.04.2014 (Annexure P/5). Hence, this petition.

4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by the impugned order dated 04.04.2014 (Annexure P/5) the application filed by the petitioner for refund of the excess amount of stamp duty paid on the registration of the sale deed was dismissed. The said dismissal was only on the ground that the application was filed beyond the period of limitation i.e. beyond three months from the date of registration.

5. The petitioner has referred to the provisions of the Act of 1899 i.e. sub-section (2) of Section 45. It is submitted that the authority only taking aid of the said provision has dismissed the application. It is submitted that where in any statute the application of the provisions of Limitation Act are not expressly barred then in such case by taking aid of the Limitation Act, such delay can be condoned. It is submitted that the delay was not inordinate and, according to him, it was only of one month. Therefore, the authority ought to have considered the case of the petitioner leniently by applying the provisions of the Limitation Act.

6. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the High Court of Bombay in the case of Nanji Dana Patel vs. State of Maharashtra - WP No. 1897/2019 decided on 27th August, 2024. It is submitted that in a similar set of facts the writ petition was allowed considering that though the application for condonation of delay was not filed but treating the writ petition to be an application for condonation o

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