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2026 Supreme(Online)(MP) 4512

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Vivek Jain, J
MUKESH KUMAR KEWAT AND OTHERS – Appellant
Versus
GAYA PRASAD KEWAT AND OTHERS – Respondent
MISC. PETITION No. 2688 of 2026 | MISC. PETITION No. 2744 of 2026



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Girish Shrivastava, Akhilesh Kumar Choubey, Balram Yadav
For the Respondents: Naveen Ahuja

After the Hindu Succession Act 1956, children cannot easily restrain elderly parents from enjoying or alienating property based on a claim of birthright without a strong prima facie case of coparcenary, particularly for properties acquired after 1956.

Headnote:(A) Temporary Injunction - Partition Suit - Senior Citizens - Restraining an elderly parent from enjoying or alienating property requires a strong prima facie case of coparcenary; casual claims cannot override the basic human rights of senior citizens to enjoy their property in the evening of their life. (Para 8)

(B) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Coparcenary and Birthright - After the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the theory of birthright is modified, and succession for Hindu males dying intestate is governed by Section 8 and the Schedule of the Act, precluding automatic inference of coparcenary for properties succeeded after 1956. (Para 9, 10, 11)

Issues: Whether the appellate court was justified in vacating the temporary injunction regarding properties that did not prima facie appear to be coparcenary properties, especially considering the age of the father.

Table of Content
1. procedural history of partition suit and temporary injunction orders. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5)
2. petitioner's challenge against the partial vacation of the injunction. (Para 6)
3. protection of senior citizens' rights to enjoy and alienate property. (Para 7 , 8)
4. impact of hindu succession act 1956 on the theory of birthright. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12)
5. application of law to specific property acquisition dates and final dismissal. (Para 13 , 14 , 15)

ORDER

Since both these petitions have been filed challenging the same order but by different parties i.e. one filed by plaintiff and the other filed by defendant No.2, therefore, they are being heard together and decided by this common order.

2. The challenge in the present petitions is made to the order passed by the appellate Court dated 02.04.2026, whereby the appellate Court has partly vacated the temporary injunction granted by the trial Court vide order dated 04.05.2024 and against such partial modification of the temporary injunction order, the plaintiff as well as the defendant No.2 are before this Court.

3. A Civil Suit has been filed by the plaintiff Jai Kumar on the assertions that the defendant No.1 is his father and defendant Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 are his brothers and sisters. Suit is for partition of property held by the defendant No.1 father, and filed in his lifetime on the assertion that the defendant No.1 father holds the property which in fact belongs to coparcenary of the defendant No.1 and his children and the suit has been filed projecting existence of coparcenary. It is contended in the suit that the defendant No.1, though he is recorded owner of the properties, but since he has inherited the properties from his ancestors, therefore, he cannot deal with the properties in the manner he likes, except his own share in the properties. All his children are having birthright in the property.

4. The trial Court had granted temporary injunction for all the four properties in the matter of possession, construction as well as alienation. The appellate Court has restricted the said temporary injunction order to two properties in place of the originally four properties for which temporary injunction was granted.

5. The suit has been filed for properties in Survey Nos.288/1, 71/1, 277/5 and 446. The trial Court granted temporary injunction for all the four properties, but the appellate Court has restricted the temporary injunction only for two lands and for remaining two parcels of land i.e. the Survey No.288/1 and 71/1, the appellate Court has vacated the order of temporary injunction, holding that these properties prima facie do not adhere to the coparcenary properties.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner had vehemently argued that the appellate Court having held that the properties in Survey Nos.288/1 and 71/1 having held not to be coparcenary properties, in fact amounts to adjudication of the suit itself and this could not have been done at preliminary and interlocutory stage by the appellate Court. Therefore, the order of the appellate Court needs to be set aside and temporary injunction needs to be granted to the petitioners. It is argued that the grievance of all the other parties are against the defendants No.1 and 5 because the defendant No.1 who is the father is highly in favour of the defendant No.5 who is one of his children and brother of the other parties and anyhow father wants to give maximum benefit to defendant No.5 by alienating the properties in favour of defendant No.5, which should not be permitted.

7. Upon considering the aforesaid assertions, it is seen that the appellate Court has held that the defendant No.1 father is an old man around 90 years of age and at such an age lightly no restraint for enjoyment of property should be put in place so as to prevent a person in old age for enjoyment of his property.

8. This Court is in agreement with the aforesaid logic and reasoning of the lower appellate

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