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2026 Supreme(Online)(MP) 36832

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Jai Kumar Pillai, J
Bherusingh – Appellant
Versus
Karulal – Respondent
CRR 1718/2026



Advocates:
Harshwardhan Singh Rathore[P-1],

A minimal delay in filing an appeal against conviction should be condoned to ensure substantial justice. Dismissing an appeal at the threshold on technical grounds without merit review is improper, and the requirement of surrender for revision is inapplicable when the appellate court has not adjudicated the merits.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - Liberal construction - The expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice - A short delay of 12 days in filing an appeal against conviction should be treated with a justice-oriented approach rather than a hyper-technical one - Dismissal of an appeal at the threshold without adjudication on merits, solely on the ground of a minimal delay, is unsustainable in law. (Paras 3, 6, 27)

(B) High Court Rules - Rule 48 - Requirement of surrender - Applicability - Where an appeal is dismissed by the lower appellate court on technical grounds of limitation without hearing the case on merits, the mandatory requirement of surrender for filing a revision petition is not applicable, as enforcing such a rule would result in excessive procedural hardship and deny the statutory right of appeal. (Paras 24, 26)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner was convicted for the dishonor of a cheque. An appeal filed against the conviction was dismissed by the lower appellate court due to a 12-day delay in filing, without considering the merits of the case. The petitioner challenged this dismissal in a revision petition, seeking condonation of the delay and exemption from the requirement of surrender.

Findings of Court:
The lower appellate court adopted a hyper-technical and pedantic approach. A 12-day delay is minimal and should be condoned to ensure that the statutory right of appeal is not defeated. The court held that the procedural requirement of surrender does not apply when the appellate court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on its merits.

Issues: Whether the lower appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal on limitation grounds and whether the requirement of surrender applies to the revision petition when the appeal was dismissed at the threshold.

Ratio Decidendi: Courts should lean in favor of adjudication on merits rather than dismissing matters on technical grounds. A liberal approach to “sufficient cause” is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to protect the valuable statutory right of appeal.

Result: Revision allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded to the lower appellate court to decide the appeal on merits after condoning the delay.

ORDER

The present Criminal Revision Petition has been preferred by the revisionist under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 438 read with 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). This revision is preferred against the impugned order dated 02.04.2026 passed in MJCR No. 148/2026 by the learned IInd Additional Session Judge, Jaora, District Ratlam. By way of the impugned order, the learned Session Court dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner strictly on the ground of a 12-day limitation delay, thereby refusing to condone the delay and declining to hear the appeal on its merits. Consequently, the original judgment and order dated 30.01.2026 passed in SCNIA/153/2022 by the Judicial Magistrate, Jaora, District Ratlam, convicting the petitioner under the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act) and sentencing him to Rigorous Imprisonment along with a compensation deposit of Rs. 1,40,000/- with 6% interest, was upheld.

FACTS IN BRIEF

2. The factual matrix necessary for the disposal of the present revision is that the respondent filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act before the trial Court regarding the dishonor of a cheque amounting to Rs. 1,40,000/- due to "insufficient funds".

After the conclusion of the trial, the Judicial Magistrate, Jaora, convicted the petitioner vide judgment dated 30.01.2026, sentencing him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment and directing the deposit of Rs. 1,40,000/- as compensation along with 6% interest within three months. Aggrieved by the conviction, the petitioner preferred a criminal appeal before the learned Session Judge, Jaora. However, the said appeal was filed with a delay of 12 days. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved alongside the appeal, citing the petitioner's rural background, ignorance of the limitation period, and intervening Court holidays as reasons for the delay. The learned Session Court, vide the impugned order dated 02.04.2026, dismissed the Section 5 application at the threshold without hearing the appeal on its merits.

CONTENTIONS OF THE REVISIONIST

3. The revisionist contends that the impugned order is contrary to settled principles governing the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Learned Sessions Court has erred in law in adopting a hyper-technical and pedantic approach while rejecting the application for condonation of delay of merely 12 days, disregarding the settled principle that the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice.

4. The revisionist further submitted that refusal to condone short delay defeats the right to appeal and causes grave miscarriage of justice. The dismissal of the appeal by the learned Court below, at the threshold without adjudication on merits has resulted in denial of the statutory right of appeal, which is a valuable right available to the accused.

5. It is also contended that the learned Sessions Court failed to appreciate that the delay was bonafide and sufficiently explained. The petitioner had clearly explained that he belongs to a rural background, was unaware of the limitation period, and was also prevented due to intervening Court holidays. These reasons constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

6. The revisionist argues that the learned Court below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. The learned Sessions Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in a judicious manner by not properly appreciating the reasons given in the application under Section 5 and by rejecting it mechanically without recording cogent reasons. In quasi-criminal matters like N.I. Act, a liberal approach is required to ensure a fair trial and justice, and Courts are required to lean in favor of adjudication on merits.

7. It is further submitted that the impugned order results in failure of justice and abuse of p

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