IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL

COMMISSION

Date of Institution:06.01.2020

Date of Hearing :02.05.2023

Date of Decision :18.09.2023

FIRST APPEAL NO. 1/2020

IN THE MATTER OF

MS. PREETI KUMARI

D/O LATE MR. PRADEEP KUMAR,

R/O CD-11E, HARI NAGAR,

NEW DELHI-110064

…APPLICANT/APPELLANT

VERSUS

1. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.

604, KAILASH BUILDING

NEW DELHI-110001

2. SBI CARDS & PAYMENT SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED

P.O. BAG NO.28

G.P.O., NEW DELHI-110001

ALSO AT:-

DLF INFINTY TOWERS, TOWER-C,

12^TH FLOOR, BLOCK-2,

BUILDING 3, DLF CYBER CITY,

GURGAON-122002.

....NON-APPLICANTS/ RESPONDENTS

CORAM:

HON’BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)

HON’BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

HON’BLE MR. J.P. AGRAWAL, MEMBER (GENERAL)

Present:

Mr.

Himanshu

Sharma,

counsel

for

the

appellant/applicant.

Mr. Inder Pal Singh, AR of Respondent No.1.

None for Respondent No.2.

PER: HON’BLE MS. PINKI, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

1.

The present appeal has been filed on 06.01.2020 challenging the

impugned order dated 01.06.2019 vide which Complaint Case

No.466/2009 was dismissed by the District Consumer Disputes

Redressal Commission-VI (New District), M-Block, Vikas Bhawan,

I.P. Estate, New Delhi-110002.

2.

This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.982/2023

seeking condonation of delay of 07-08 days in filing the appeal,

filed alongwith the appeal. Affidavit of the appellant has been filed

alongwith this application.

3.

The record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.

4.

The application has been moved without any provision of law.

However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer

Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case

No.466/2009.

5.

Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various

grounds. Para No.1 to 4 of the application read as under:

“1. That the certified copy of the Order was received by the

Complainant/Applicant on 22.11.2019.

2. That the Complainant/Applicant had handed over the

file to his counsel Sh. Vinod Malhotra Advocate.

3. That due to the sad turn of events there were three

deaths in the relations of the Counsel for the

Complainant/Applicant. One on the Ground Floor of the

building (6/7, 3^rd Floor, Tilak Nagar, New Delhi-

110018)

in

which

the

Counsel

for

the

Complainant/applicant resides, another in the next

door/adjoining and another in a family friend.

4. That the counsel for the complainant/applicant was

busy in condolences.”

6.

To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section

15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as

under:-

“Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District

Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the

State Commission within a period of thirty days from

the date of the order, in such form and manner as may

be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an

appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it

is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it

within that period:

[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is

required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the

District Forum, shall be entertained by the State

Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the

prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or twenty-

five thousand rupees, whichever is less]”

7.

A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the

appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of

thirty days from the date of impugned judgment. On perusal of

record before us, it is clear that the impugned order was

pronounced on 01.06.2019 and the present appeal was filed on

06.01.2020 i.e. after a delay of 189 days.

8.

In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this

Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the

appeal after the stipulated period. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has

been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The

Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The

relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as

under:-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant

could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of

the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough",

inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose

intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no

more than that which provides a platitude, which when

the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose

intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a

case, duly examined from the view point of a

reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,

"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have

acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of

bona fide on its part in view of the facts and

circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the

party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".

However, the facts and circumstances of each case

must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court

concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that

whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be

exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the

Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"

from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory

explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the

application for condonation of delay. The court has to

examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was

merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”

9.

We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs.

United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in

IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as

under:-

“12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to

justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has

not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent

judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial

Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held

that

while

deciding

the

application

filed

for

condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind

that

special

period

of

limitation

has

been

prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act,

1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer

matters and the object of expeditious adjudication

of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the

appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are

entertained.”

10. We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc.

Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C)

Nos.2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the

Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: -

“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by

the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned

trial Court that delay has not been properly

explained and even there are no merits in the

application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the

matter should rest there and the condonation of

delay application was required to be dismissed. The

approach adopted by the learned trial Court that,

even after finding that, in absence of any material

evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been

explained and that there are no merits in the

application, still to condone the delay would be

giving a premium to a person who fails to explain

the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At

this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of

PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer,

reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred

to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the

law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but

it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so

prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period

of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision

may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party

but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full

effect to the same.

11. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the

Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’

means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner

or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant

must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient

cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory

explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the

application for condonation of delay.

12. Reverting to the material available before us, we find that the

impugned order was passed on 01.06.2019 and the period of

limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on

01.07.2019. However, the appellant has failed to file the present

appeal within the stipulated period and the reason for delay

stated in the application are that certified copy of the impugned

order dated 01.06.2019 was received by the Appellant/applicant

on 22.11.2019, thereafter, file was handed over to the counsel Mr.

Vinod Malhotra but due to three deaths in relation of the counsel,

the present appeal was filed with a delay of 7-8 days.

13. In the present case, the Appellant has explained the delay caused

in filing this appeal, in Para No. 1 to 4 of the application for

condonation of delay, it has been submitted by the Appellant that

certified copy of the impugned order was received by the appellant

on 22.11.2019.

14. We

deem

it

appropriate

to

refer

the

following

recent

pronouncements of the Hon’ble National Commission Disputes

Redressal Commission:-

I. Judgment dated 16.06.2023 passed in Revision Petition No.

1246 of 2023 titled as Shashank Anil Singh vs. Star Health

& Allied Insurance Company (Against the Order dated

20/04/2023 in Appeal No. 104/2023 of the State Commission

Delhi), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under: -

“1. Heard Mr. Shashank Anil Singh, the petitioner in

person.

2. The above revision has been filed against the Order

of Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission

dated 20.04.2023 dismissing the FA No. 104 of 2023 as

time-barred in as much as the delay condonation

application has been rejected. Petitioner pointed that

impugned Order was passed on 20.01.2023 and free

copy has been supplied on 24.01.2023. The period of 45

days from supply of the free copy expired on 10.03.2023

while the appeal was filed on 10.03.2023 there was no

delay at all. The State Commission wrongly dismissed

the appeal as time-barred.

3. A perusal of the Order of State Commission shows

that the State Commission has counted limitation from the

date of pronouncing the judgement dated 20.01.2023

while under section 12 of the Limitation Act the period in

obtaining the certified copy has to be excluded and,

therefore, the order of State Commission suffers from

error apparent on the face of record. It is liable to be set

aside. The revision is allowed. The Order of State

Commission dated 20.04.2023 passed in FA No. 104 of

2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted to State

Commission who shall admit the appeal and proceed to

decide the same on merits in accordance with law after

giving notice to the other side.

4. The principal onus of informing the respondent of

this instant Order shall be of the petitioner. He shall do so

within two weeks from today, without fail, and file proof

thereof before the State Commission on or before the next

date of hearing before it.

However, if for whatever reason, the respondent does not

appear before the State Commission on the date of

hearing, the State Commission shall issue notice for

requiring its presence in order to proceed in accordance

with law in the matter, as directed by this Commission.

The State Commission in such a situation may also

require the petitioner to take adequate steps in order to

facilitate service on the respondent.

In case the respondent has objection, it may file

appropriate application before the State Commission,

submitting that it will raise its objection before this

Commission (National Commission). In such contingency,

the State Commission shall not proceed further with the

appeal for a period of three months. In the said period of

three months, the respondent may file appropriate

application before this Commission to raise its objection.

5. If the respondent move appropriate application in this

Commission within the aforesaid period of three months,

or before, further proceedings of the State Commission

shall be subject to the orders that may be passed by this

Commission on such application. If the respondent does

not approach this Commission in the period of aforesaid

three months (or before), the State Commission shall

further proceed in the matter in accordance with law.”

II. Judgment dated 17.07.2023 passed in Revision Petition No.

1360 of 2023 titled as Sudha Kapil & Anr. vs. Ramprastha

Promoters & Developers Pvt. Ltd. (Against the Order dated

07/03/2023 in Appeal No. 9/2023 of the State Commission

Delhi), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under: -

“1. This revision petition has been filed under section

58(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in challenge

to the Order dated 07.03.2023 of the State Commission in

appeal no. 09 of 2023 arising out of the Order dated

11.11.2022 of the District Commission in complaint no.

284 of 2020.

2. It appears that the earlier second appeal no. 20 of

2023 was filed by the revisionists (the ‘complainants’)

and the following Order dated 03.05.2023 was passed

by this Commission therein. The relevant paragraphs of

the said Order are reproduced below for reference:

1. This second appeal no. 20 of 2023 has been

filed under Section 51(2) of the Act 2019 apropos the

State Commission’s Order dated 07.03.2023 in first

appeal no. 09 of 2023 arising out of the District

Commission’s Order dated 11.11.2022 in complaint

no. 284 of 2020.

2. Learned counsel for the appellants (the

‘complainants’) submits that the complainants are

aggrieved with the impugned Order of 07.03.2023

since not only has the State Commission erred in

calculating the period of delay in filing first appeal

before it but has also erred in holding that sufficient

cause to condone the delay was not forthcoming.

Submission is that the State Commission has

committed jurisdictional error and acted with material

irregularity. Learned counsel further submits that the

complainants wish to withdraw their present second

appeal and in its stead want to file revision under

Section 58(1)(b) of the Act 2019.

3. In the wake of the above submissions the

second appeal is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty

to the complainants to file revision under Section

58(1)(b) of the Act 2019.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the revisionists (the

‘complainants’).

Perused

the

record

including inter

alia the