ORDER

1. None appears for the respondent despite substituted service by way of publication in a newspaper. Accordingly, the respondent is proceeded ex parte on merits.

2. RP has been filed with a delay of 36 days as per the calculation made by the Registry. An IA/4710/2017 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. The delay in filing the RP is condoned after considering the reasons stated therein and the case is taken up on merits.

3. Challenge is to the order dated 29.11.2016 of the State Commission vide which two appeals, one filed by the appellant herein i.e., Appeal No. 963 of 2014 and the other filed by the complainant/respondent i.e., Appeal No. 1521 of 2014, were taken up together. Counsel for the appellant submits that both the appeals were dismissed on account of limitation. The appeal filed by the appellant herein was delayed by two months while the delay in the appeal filed by the complainant/respondent was longer than this period.

4. The main question for consideration is whether in the given facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismiss it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases.

5. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic, allowing courts to interpret it in a way that promotes justice, aligning with the judiciary's fundamental purpose. Substantial justice should take precedence over technicalities, as the opposing party does not have a vested right in benefiting from non-deliberate delays. In State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered pragmatically with a justice-oriented approach rather than through a technical analysis of every day's delay. It asserted that matters should be decided on their merits unless they are hopelessly without merit. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the condonation of delay is at the discretion of the court, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not impose any specific time limit for this discretion. The length of the delay is no matter; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. A short delay may be uncondonable without a acceptable explanation, while a long delay can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory. If the initial court refuses to condone the delay, the superior court is free to reconsider the cause for delay and reach its own conclusion independently of the lower court's decision. The term "sufficient cause" should be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice. In Ram Nath Sao Vs. Gobardhan Sao (2002) 3 SCC 195, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or similar provisions should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, provided there is no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides attributable to the party. Determining whether the explanation constitutes "sufficient cause" depends on the facts of each case, without a rigid formula. Courts should generally accept explanations for delays and refuse them only exceptionally, especially when no fault can be ascribed to the defaulting party. However, the courts must also consider that a delay might confer a valuable right to the other party, which should not be dismissed lightly. Courts should avoid a pedantic and hyper-technical approach, particularly when significant stakes or arguable po