SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2023 Supreme(Online)(NCLT) 3062

NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL
RAHUL GYANCHANDANI – Appellant
Versus
PARSVNATH LANDMARK DEVELOPERS PRIVATELIMITED – Respondent
C.P. (IB) - 454/2023



Advocates:
For the Petitioner:DSN LEGAL

IN THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL: NEW DELHI PRINCIPAL BENCH ITEM No. 6 IN THE MATTER OF:

Rahul Gyanchandani & ors. …. Petitioner/Applicant v.

Parsvnath Landmark Developers Private …. Respondent Limited Order Under Section 7 of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016 Order delivered on 17.10.2023 CORAM:

SH. ASHOK KUMAR BHARDWAJ HON’BLE MEMBER (JUDICIAL) SH. AVINASH K. SRIVASTAVA HON’BLE MEMBER (TECHNICAL)

(HEARING THROUGH PHYSICAL MODE & VC)

PRESENT:

For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajat Juneja, Mr. Karan Rajpurohit, Advs.

For the Financial : Mr. Sataroop Das, Adv.

Creditor ORDER

1. Indubitably the captioned petition has been preferred by 4 Petitioners while the total number of allottees qua the CD is 488. As can be seen from the proviso under Section 7(1) of the IBC, 2016, a petition on behalf of the Homebuyers (as Financial Creditors in a class) is maintainable only if either 100 in number or 10% of the allottees join the petition. Apparently, the Petitioners before us are neither 100 in number nor are they 10%

of the allottees. Thus exercise of the petition is not maintainable.

2. Nevertheless, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner relied upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. A. Balakrishnan & Anr.” in Civil Appeal No. 689 of 2021 to espouse that since the petitioner has a decree in its favour passed by RERA , they need to be treated as Financial Creditor and the amount payable by them being over Rs. 1 crore which is defaulted to be paid by the CD, the present petition is maintainable. A reference has been made to Para-53 of the judgement which reads thus:

“53. Having held that a liability in respect of a claim arising out of a Recovery Certificate would be a “financial debt” within the ambit of its definition under clause (8) of Section 5 of the IBC, as a natural corollary thereof, the holder of such Recovery Certificate would be a financial creditor within the meaning of clause (7) of Section 5 of the IBC. As such, such a “person” would be a “person” as provided under Section 6 of the IBC who would be entitled to initiate the CIRP.”

3. On the contrary, the Ld. Counsel appearing for the CD relied upon the recent judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Vishal Chelani & Ors. Vs. Debashis Nanda” in Civil Appeal No. 3806 of 2023. With reference to the judgement, he submitted that the petitioner could approach RERA only because they are Homebuyers, thus after the decrees passed by RERA, their classification/status cannot be changed from the Homebuyers to Financial Creditors. Para 8 & 9 of the judgement read out by Ld. Counsel for the CD are thus:

“8. The Resolution Professional's view appears to be that once an allotted seeks remedies under RERA, and opts for return of money in terms of the order made in her favour, it is not open for her to be treated in the class of home buyer. This Court is unpersuaded by the submission. It is only home buyers that can approach and seek remedies under RERA - no others. In such circumstances, to treat a particular segment of that class differently for the purposes of another enactment, on the ground that one or some of them had elected to take back the deposits together with such interest as ordered by the competent authority, would be highly inequitable. As held in Natwar Agarwal (HUF) (Supra) by the Mumbai Bench of National Company Law Tribunal the underlying claim of an aggrieved party is crystallized in the form of a Court order or decree. That does not alter or disturb the status of the concerned party in the present case of allottees as financial creditors. Furthermore, Section 238 of the IBC contains a non obstante clause which gives overriding effect to its provisions. Consequently, its provisions acquire primacy, and cannot be read as subordinate to the RERA Act. In any case, the distinction made by the R.

P. is artificial; it amounts to "hyper-classification" and falls afoul of Article 14. Such an interpretation cann

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top