15 th May 2024 B.P. Routray, J.

1. Present appeal by the claimants is directed against the judgment dated 27th March 2023 of 2nd Additional District Judge-cum-3rd MACT, Bhubaneswar passed in M.A.C. Case No.113 of 2012, wherein the claim application was dismissed on the ground of limitation without granting any compensation.

2. Heard Mr.P.K.Mishra, learned counsel for Appellants and Mr.S.K.Sarangi, learned counsel for the Insurer-Respondent No.2 as well as Mr.M.K.Mishra, learned counsel for Respondent No.1.

3. The accident took place on 21st February 1994 and the claim application was filed on 6th July 2012. The M.V. Amendment Act 1994 came into force on 14th November 1994 by deleting sub-section 3 of Section 166 of the M.V.Act. Prior to its deletion, sub-section 3 of Section 166 was read as under:

“166(3); No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident.

Provided that the claim tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”

4. A bare reading of aforesaid provision reveals that a claim application, prior to coming into force Amendment Act, 1994 could be filed within a period of six months from the date of accident without any limitation and for next six months subject to satisfaction of the Court on prevalence of sufficient cause for not filing the application within first six months.

5. Now coming to the facts of the present case, the accident took place on 21st February 1994 and adding six months, the date would be 21 st August 1994 without counting any limitation. But further six months time was available to the claimants to present the claim application subject to satisfaction on the question of limitation, i.e. about sufficient cause preventing him from making the application. Therefore, it was open for the claimant to present the claim application on or before 20 th February 1995, had the amended provision (1994) not brought into to force. When the amended provision came into force on 14th November 1994 deleting the provisions counting limitation under Section 166(3), then the question of limitation in presenting the claim application did not exist after 14th November 1994. So the option was open for the claimant to present the claim application at any time after 14 th November 1994 without any bar of limitation.

6. The Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vrs. C.Padma and another, 2004 (1) T.A.C. 10 (S.C.), analyzing the effect of omission of sub-section 3 of Section 166, have observed as follows: <br/>

“10. The ratio laid down in Dhannalal’s case (supra), applies with full force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition was filed sub-section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted. Thus, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place. Faced with this situation, Mr Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal case does not consider Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, undoubtedly, provides that the repeal of a provision will not affect the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of repeal. However, this is subject to “unless a different intention appears”. In Dhannalal case the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out. It is noted that Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victims of accidents if the claim petition was rejected only on the ground of limitation.

Thus “the different intention” clearly appears and Section 6-A of th