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2025 Supreme(Online)(Ori) 401
ORISSA HIGH COURT
G. Satapathy, J
R. Venkat Ramanan – Appellant
Versus
State Of Odisha – Respondent
CRLREV No.643 of 2024
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Ramani. K.
For the Respondents: R.B. Mishra
A discharge application during criminal proceedings must be assessed solely on police reports and documentary evidence to determine if a prima facie case exists. Revisional courts must refrain from re-appreciating evidence or conducting mini-trials, limiting interference only to instances of patent illegality or perversity.
Headnote:(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 239, 397, 401 - Bharitya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 262(2) - Discharge from criminal proceedings - Grounds for discharge - Whether absence of name in complaint or acquittal of co-accused warrants discharge - Held, complaint is not an encyclopedia of facts - Acquittal of others in prior trial does not automatically entitle accused to discharge in split-up case - Court must evaluate police reports and submitted documents to determine if prima facie grounds for proceeding exist. (Paras 5, 7, 8)
(B) Revisional Jurisdiction - Scope and Ambit - Jurisdictional limits - Power to examine legality and propriety of orders - Revisional court should not act as an appellate authority or re-appreciate evidence - Interference permitted only in case of patent illegality, perversity, or error of jurisdiction - Court should not conduct mini-trial at the stage of framing charges. (Paras 7, 10, 11)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner filed a revision against the trial court's order refusing to discharge him from a case involving charges of financial fraud and illegal schemes. The petitioner contended that his name was absent in the initial complaint and that all co-accused persons had been acquitted in the primary trial, thereby necessitating his discharge from the current split-up case.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the trial court correctly evaluated the material collected during the investigation. It was determined that the primary evidence at the stage of framing charges is the police report and annexed documents. The court held that the acquittal of co-accused persons in separate trials does not constitute grounds for automatic discharge, as evidence must be evaluated in the context of the specific case.
Issues: The main issues were whether an accused is entitled to discharge based on the absence of their name in the initial complaint, how the acquittal of co-accused affects a pending split-up case, and the scope of a revisional court in challenging orders refusing discharge.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of framing charges, the court must assume the material on record is true and test for the existence of strong or grave suspicion rather than conducting a mini-trial or re-evaluating evidence. Revisional power is restricted to identifying patent defects or errors of law; the court shall not substitute its own view for the trial court’s legitimate assessment of prima facie evidence.
Result: The criminal revision was dismissed on contest.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. procedural background and factual allegations leading to the discharge petition filing. (Para 1 , 2 , 3) |
| 2. summary of rival arguments regarding the justification for discharging the accused. (Para 4) |
| 3. statutory requirements for discharge and threshold for revisional interference. (Para 5 , 6 , 7) |
| 4. prima facie test for framing of charge and the non-applicability of acquittal of co-accused in separate trials. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 5. final order of the court dismissing the revision petition. (Para 12) |
G. Satapathy, J.
1. This criminal revision is directed against the impugned order dated 29.08.2024 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ganjam at Berhampur in G.R. Case No. 366 of 2011-(B) refusing to discharge the petitioner from the criminal case for commission of offences punishable U/S.120(B)/420/ 468/471/34 of IPC r/w. Sections 4 /5/6 of Prize Chits & Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978 (in short, “the Act”).
2. Briefly stated, the allegations against the petitioner are that one K.Chakrapani Reddy of village Chamakhandi lodged a FIR before IIC, Chamakhandi stating therein that on 01.07.2010 the accused V.Lachhmeya Reddy of M/s. Rightmax Technotrade International Ltd. had given assurance to him and other villagers to get triple benefit in 33 months of deposit of any amount. The said company was managed by the petitioner and others and believing the words of V.Lachhmeya Reddy, the informant had deposited Rs.9,00,000/- on 01.07.2010 in the said company and received bond of Rs.14,000/-, Rs.10,000/- and Rs.10,000/- on 10.07.2010, 16.10.2010 and 01.07.2010. Despite deposit of the money, the informant did not receive any bond as regards to his total deposit. It is also stated by him in the FIR that other villagers had deposited money, but when he and other villagers did not get refund of their deposit, he lodged the FIR which came to be registered as Chamakhandi P.S. Case No. 92 of 2011 resulting in commencement of investigation which ultimately ended in submission of charge sheet against the petitioner and others for commission of offence punishable U/S. 120(B)/420/468/471/34 of IPC r/w. Sections 4 /5/6 of the Act.
3. On the basis of materials collected in the investigation, cognizance of offence was taken and some of the accused persons faced trial before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ganjam at Berhampur in G.R. Case No. 366 of 2011, however, the said accused persons numbering 04 facing the trial got acquitted in the original case on conclusion of trial. Since the petitioner and five other accused persons did not appear in the original case, the case against them was separated and split up by the learned trial Court vide G.R. Case No. 366 of 2011- (B), but subsequently the petitioner and four others appeared in the split up case, however, only the petitioner filed a discharge petition to discharge him from this case for commission of offence punishable U/Ss. 120(B)/420/468/471/34 of IPC r/w. Sections 4 /5/6 of the Act mainly on two grounds that his name is absent in the FIR with no overt act being attributed to him and the acquittal of co-accused person in the original trial. The learned trial Court, however, by the impugned order rejected such discharge petition of the petitioner giving rise to the present revision.
4. In the course of hearing of the revision, Mr. Ramani. K., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that co-accused standing on similar footing has already been acquitted by the learned trial Court in G.R. Case No. 366 of 2011 and the name of the petitioner being conspicuously absent in the FIR and no overt act having been attributed against the petitioner, the petitioner should have been discharged from the case. However, the learned trial Court erroneously applied the law and rejected the discharge petition of the petitioner which can be rectified by allowing this revision. Accordingly, Mr. Ramani. K., learned counsel for the petitioner prays to allo
