Adequate justification is essential for granting extensions of time for payment of deficit court fee under Section 149 of the CPC.

ORDER

Order No. 29.07.2025 Misc. Case No.33 of 2016

07. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.

2. This Misc. Case has been filed along with the Appeal Memo for granting six weeks’ time to pay the court fee.

3. As this Misc. Case has become infructuous since long, the same stands dismissed.

(S.K. Mishra)

Judge I.A. No.148 of 2025 & LAA No.15 of 2016

08. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.

2. This is an application filed under Section 149 of CPC for acceptance of Court Fee of Rs.7635/-, which was paid on 18.01.2023 on the ground that, though Misc. Case No.33 of 2016 was filed along with the appeal memo to grant six weeks time to pay the court fee, subsequently, the court fee was paid on 18.01.2023 after the same was sanctioned by the competent authority. There was no inaction and mala fide intention on the part of the petitioner/appellant in paying the deficit court fee at the time of filing of the appeal.

3. This Court in the case of ( Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Sambaru Bariha ), reported in AIR 1994 Orissa 90 held as follows:

“2. It may first be stated with respect that the learned single Judge is right in his observation that Section 149 of the Code is an exception to the general rule of paying court-fee at the time of filing of a document as enjoined by Section 4 of the Court-Fees Act , 1875. It is apparent that an exception cannot be made a rule. Any other view would amount to amending Section 149 of the Code, because, instead of discretion resting with the Court in the matter of allowing payment of the deficit court-fee, it would be open to a litigant to claim this benefit almost as a matter of right, whereas Section 149 gives power to grant time on the Court being satisfied on a case being made out for the same.

5. Despite the above, we would observe that when Section 149 has not put any fetter on the exercise of discretion, it may not be permissible to do so by laying any guideline as such. All that can justifiably be said is that the Court while exercising the discretion has to bear in mind that the power conferred is meant to be exercised in exceptional case and on being satisfied that non-payment of court- fee in time is for reason beyond the control of the appellant and the same is not due to his negligence. The ground shown has therefore to be adequate, cogent and strong, because, otherwise the exception would take the form of rule which would militate against the legislative intention.

6. With the aforesaid in mind, we answer the three questions framed by the learned single Judge. In so far as the first question is concerned, we state that the fact of non-receipt of the amount (by an advocate) required for purchase of court-fee cannot ordinarily be a "good cause" for extension of time, because in such a case non-receipt is not a 'cause'; it is really an effect. The cause lies somewhere else. It is the soundness of the cause basing on which discretionary power has to be invoked to come to the aid of a litigant. It may be a 'cause' for the advocate (Advocate-General in the present case); but the Advocate-General is not the appellant. Appellant is the State and the Advocate-General is an agent of the State within the meaning of Order III of the Code. The cause which has, however, to exist is not one which is relatable as to why the agent is being required to file the appeal with deficit court-fee but why the principal could not make available the required amount to the agent. The cause of the agent cannot be the cause for the principal; and it is the cause of the principal which is relevant, and not the cause at the hand of the agent. In an exceptional case it may however be that though the principal has sent the amount, the same has not reached the hands of the agent, say due to postal strike, natural calamity or the like. In such cases, cause of non-receipt of the amount by the agent may also provide good ground; but not when the required amount had not been remitted at all to the agent. In such a case