IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRP No.42 of 2023 Snigdharani Barik …. Petitioner Mr. Satyabadi Mantry, Advocate -versus-

Kalendra Maszid and others …. Opposite Parties Mr. Jajati Keshari Khuntia, Advocate for O.P.No.1 Mr. MD Fayaz, Advocate for O.P. No.8 CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Order No. ORDER

09. 08.01.2025 CRP No.42 of 2023 & I.A. Nos.66, 65 & 64 of 2024 This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.

2. As per office note it shows that notice issued to opposite party Nos. 5(a) and 5(b) returned unserved with a report “unclaimed”. It is stated by Mr. Satyabadi Mantry, learned counsel for the petitioner that the “unclaimed” notice as against the said opposite parties be treated as sufficient.

This Court takes note of following observation made in Ajeet Seeds Ltd. Vrs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 8 SCR 880:

“9. This Court then explained the nature of presumptions under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the GC Act and pointed out how these two presumptions are to be employed while considering the question of service of notice under Section 138 of the NI Act. The relevant paragraphs read as under:

„13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the Court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the Court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the Act is a far stronger presumption. Further; while Section 114 of Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of G. C. Act is extracted below:

„27. Meaning of service by post.- Where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorizes or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression „serve‟ or either of the expressions „give‟ or „send‟ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre- paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post‟.

14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service G of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent , by registered post and is returned with a postal · endorsement „refused‟ or „not available in the house‟ or „house locked‟ or „shop closed‟ or „addressee not in station‟, due service has to be presumed. [Vide Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh (1992) 1 SCC