IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C). No. 21800 of 2025

(An application under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India)

*******

Kainta Samal …. Petitioner

-versus-

1. The Arbitrator under NH Act, 1956

-cum- District Magistrate &

Collector, Sambalpur

2. Land Acquisition Officer &

Competent Authority, NH-55

Project, Collectorate, Sambalpur. …. Opp. Parties

Ad vocate for the parties:

For Petitioner : Mr. Rabindra Nath Debata, Advocate

For Opposite Parties : Mr. Swayambhu Mishra,

Additional Standing Counsel

CORAM:

JUSTICE K.R. MOHAPATRA

JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

Heard and Disposed of on : 15.09.2025

JUDGMENT

By the Bench:-

1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode.

2. Judgment dated 30^th June, 2025 passed by the District Judge, Sambalpur in Arbitration Petition No. 7 of 2023 filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(for brevity ‘the Arbitration Act’) is under challenge in this writ petition.

3. At the outset, Mr. Swayambhu Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel raised objection with regard to maintainability of the writ petition submitting that the Petitioner has a remedy of appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. He also relied upon the ratio in the case of Serosoft Solutions Private Limited Vrs. Dexter Capital Advisors Private Limited; AIR 2025 SC 357 (2025 INSC 26) in support of his submission in which Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-

“14. In any event of the matter when the Arbitral Tribunal by its order dated 09.10.2024 held - ‘that far and no further’, to the respondent/claimant’s endeavour to cross- examine RW-1, the High Court should have restrained itself from interfering. In order to justify its interference and extension of time, the High Court has referred to and relied on a judgment of the same Court. Certain conditions for exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 are mentioned in the judgment. Conditions (v) and (vi) of the said judgment could have provided sufficient guidance for the High Court to consider whether interference is warranted or not. The relevant portion of the said order is as under:-

“(v) Interference is permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.

(vi) High Courts ought to discourage litigation which necessarily interfere with the arbitral process. (vii) Excessive judicial interference in the arbitral process is not encouraged.

(viii) It is prudent not to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227.

(ix) The power should be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’ or if there is ‘bad faith’ which is shown.

(x) Efficiency of the arbitral process ought not to be allowed to diminish and hence interdicting the arbitral process should be completely avoided.”

15. It is evident from the above that even as per the quote hereinabove interference Under Article 226/227 is ‘permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.’ Condition (vi) to (x) underscores the reason why High Courts ought not to interfere with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals for more than one reason.”

3.1 He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment is not coming within any of the aforesaid conditions requiring exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Further, the Petitioner has an efficacious remedy under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Hence, the writ petition being not maintainable is liable to be dismissed.

4. Mr. Rabindra Nath Debata, learned counsel for the Petitioner vehemently objects to the same and submits that the impugned judgment is not an award in the eye of law. Thus, the provision under Arbitration Act is not applicable. He further submits that learned District Judge, Sambalpur in the impugned judgment has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested under law and has committed material irregularity. As such, a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is maintainable before this Court. In the alternative, he submits that if the