CAV JUDGMENT

(Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE)

Date : 11-12-2024 The petitioners are the Chairman and Members of the Sanskrit Education Board (for brevity ‘the Board’) constituted under the Bihar Sanskrit Education Board Act, 1981 (for brevity ‘Act of 1981’); which Board stood dissolved on the amendment of the Act of 1981 by the Bihar Sanskrit Education Board (Amendment) Act, 2024 (for brevity ‘the Amendment Act’). The vires of the Amendment Act is challenged, on grounds of it being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India &

contrary to the purpose of the main Act.

2. Shri Y.V.Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, took us through the Act of 1981; especially the establishment and constitution, by way of Section 3 and Secton 4, the term of office, which is specified to be a period of three years, with effect from the date of the respective appointment or nomination. Section 9 delineates a procedure for removal of the Chairman and Section 25 deals with dissolution of existing Bihar Sanskrit Education Board. The transitory provision under Section 26 provides for the Chairman and ex-officio members constituted in the Board to continue till a Board is duly constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The present amendments seek to bring in a dissolution, during the term of a duly constituted Board, which is politically motivated by reason of the change in political alliances and frustrates the very object of the Act, which also violates the equality clause under Articles 14; are the compelling arguments. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Dr. Ashish Kumar Sinha & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 2022(6) BLJ 369 and Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

3. The learned Advocate General argued that there is no vested right conferred on the members, to continue for the three-year term and it is in advancement of the object of the Act; which is promotion of education in Sanskrit, that the amendments have been affected. There is no contention raised of the accepted grounds to challenge a legislation, being lack of legislative competence or violation of the constitutional provisions, including that of any fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

4. By reliance to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra), we should understand that the reference to Article 14, is to urge the contention that the amendment is arbitrary, which is an additional ground to challenge the legislation other than that of lack of legislative competence and violation of fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III of the Constitution or violation of any other constitutional provision.

5. In Shayara Bano (supra), it was noticed that there was a discordant note struck in State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709, by a three-Judge Bench in declaring that, but for the two grounds to challenge a law made by the Parliament or the Legislature; viz: lack of legislative competence and violation of fundamental rights or other constitutional provisions; no third ground exists. The three- Judge Bench in McDowell & Co. (supra); according to the five- Judge Bench in Shayara Bano (supra), failed to notice the Constitution Bench decision in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 and K.R.Lakshmanan v. State of Tamilnadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226. A Co-ordinate Bench in Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 737 followed Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, to find that a series of judgments delivered after Maneka Gandhi (supra), declared that Article 21 was to be read along with other fundamental rights and so read; not only has the procedure established by law to be just, fair and reasonable, but also the law itself has to be reasonable as Articles 14 and 19 have to be read into Article 21. These decisions were also not noticed by the three-Judge Be