Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

2026 Supreme(Pat) 298

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
BIBEK CHAUDHURI, CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA, JJ.
Md. Khurshid @ Md. Khurshid Rayeen Son of Md. Amanat - Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar - Respondent
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1100 of 2018
Decided On : 24-04-2026

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Mr. Praveen Kumar Agrawal, Adv Mr. Santosh Kumar Singh, Adv.
For the Respondents: Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma, APP

The expression 'bad work' by a child victim does not automatically amount to 'penetrative sexual assault' under Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act. Statutory presumptions under Section 29 do not replace the requirement for corroborative medical or ocular evidence proving penetration to sustain a conviction under the POCSO Act.

Headnote:(A) POCSO Act, 2012 - Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 29 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 376(i) - Penetrative Sexual Assault - Sexual Assault - Sexual Harassment - Conviction reversed - Prosecution failed to establish penetrative sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt - Medical evidence negated penetration - Ocular evidence of 'bad work' insufficient to presume penetration - Conviction under Section 376(i) IPC and Sections 4, 12 POCSO set aside - Conviction under Section 8 POCSO upheld - Sentence modified to period already undergone. (Paras 27, 28, 29, 31, 32)

Facts of the case:
The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for offences under Section 376(i) of the IPC and Sections 4, 8, and 12 of the POCSO Act, based on testimony that the accused removed the victim's pants and touched her, causing 'bad work' to be inferred as penetration. Medical findings showed no injury, no laceration, and no spermatozoa. The appellant challenged this on grounds of lack of corroboration.

Findings of Court:
The High Court held that the phrase 'bad work' does not automatically lead to a presumption of 'penetrative sexual assault' under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. In the absence of medical corroboration and given the age of the victim and lack of developmental indicators, the charge of penetrative sexual assault (Section 3 and 4) could not be sustained. However, the consistent ocular evidence regarding touching of private parts with sexual intent justified the conviction under Section 8 (sexual assault).

Issues: Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction for penetrative sexual assault under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, or whether the act constituted a lesser offence of sexual assault under Section 7/8.

Ratio Decidendi: Penetrative sexual assault requires clear evidence of penetration; vague terminology such as 'bad work' used by a child victim cannot be bridged by statutory presumption where medical evidence contradicts the occurrence of penetration. Sexual intent is the crux of Section 7/8, effectively established by testimony of non-penetrative touching.

Result: Appeal allowed in part; conviction under IPC and sections 4, 12 of POCSO set aside; conviction under Section 8 upheld with sentence reduced to time already served.

Table of Content
1. procedural context and summary of the trial court's conviction findings. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10)
2. arguments concerning the lack of medical evidence and the interpretation of sexual intent. (Para 11 , 12 , 13)
3. summarization and analysis of witness depositions and forensic reporting. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20)
4. legal definitions of pocso sections and binding judicial precedents on sexual assault. (Para 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25)
5. re-evaluation of evidence confirming sexual assault while rejecting penetrative sexual assault findings. (Para 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37)

JUDGMENT :

CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA, J.

Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner and learned A.P.P. for the State.

2. The present appeal has been preferred by aforesaid appellant-convict under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) challenging the impugned judgment of conviction dated 02.08.2018 and order of sentence dated 03.08.2018 respectively passed by learned A.D.J. 1 cum Special Judge (POCSO), Munger in Mahila P.S. Case No. 08 of 2018/POCSO 24 of 2018, whereby and where under the learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Section 376 (i) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘I.P.C.’) and Sections 4 , 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. Appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life alongwith fine of Rs. 25,000/- under Section 376 (i) of the I.P.C., sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years alongwith fine of Rs. 10,000/- under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years alongwith fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years alongwith fine of Rs. 5,000/- under Section 12 of the POCSO Act. In default of payment of fine, convict shall undergo simple imprisonment for six months. All the aforesaid sentences have been ordered to run concurrently.

Case of prosecution

3. The brief case of prosecution as it appears from the written report of the Shahjahan Khatoon (P.W. 3) to the SHO Mahila Police Station that on 17.06.2018 she had gone to Saharsa to see her sick sister and came at home on 19.06.2018 upon which her daughter Tasarun Najrin aged about 8 years told her that on 18.06.2018 at about 4:00 PM, when she was alone at her home appellant-accused Md. Khurshid came to her house. He laid her down on surface and opened her pants and rubbed his penis and fled away. He also threatened to not tell anyone about this occurrence.

4. On the basis of aforesaid written report, Mahila P.S. Case No. 08 of 2018 was lodged for the offences punishable under Section 376(i) of the I.P.C. and Sections 4 , 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

5. After completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the sole appellant-accused Md. Khurshid for the offences punishable under Section 376(i) of the I.P.C. and Sections 4 , 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act. Considering materials available on record cognizance of the offence was taken against the sole accused-appellant before the learned Special Judge (POCSO), on 25.06.2018.

6. To substantiate its case before learned trial court (Special Court), the prosecution has, in total, examined eight witnesses, which are:-

Sr. No(s).	Prosecution Witnesses
P.W. 1	Tasarrun Nazrin (victim)
P.W. 2	Rozida Khatoon (neighbor)
P.W. 3	Shahjahan Khatoon (mother of the victim)
P.W. 4	Dr. Niranjan Kumar
P.W. 5	Md. Zulfikar (father of the victim)
P.W. 6	Shahnaj Begum (sister of informant)
P.W. 7	Dr. Manjula Rani Mandal
P.W. 8	Punam Sinha (Investigating Officer)

7. The prosecution has also relied upon the following documents as to substantiate its case, which are as under:-

Sr. No.	Exhibit No(s).	List of documents.
1.	Exhibit -1	Signature on seizure list.
2.	Exhibit-2	Signature on seizure U/s 164 of the Cr.P.C.
3.	Exhibit-3	Signature on written report

Click Here to Read the rest of this document

2026 Supreme(Pat) 298

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNABIBEK CHAUDHURI, CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA, JJ.Md. Khurshid @ Md. Khurshid Rayeen Son of Md. Amanat - AppellantVersusThe State of Bihar - RespondentCriminal Appeal (DB) No.1100 of 2018Decided On : 24-04-2026

Cases Referred (3)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
BIBEK CHAUDHURI, CHANDRA SHEKHAR JHA, JJ.
Md. Khurshid @ Md. Khurshid Rayeen Son of Md. Amanat - Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar - Respondent
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.1100 of 2018
Decided On : 24-04-2026