IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Zubedan and another . . . . Appellants vs.

Pritam Singh and others . . . . Respondents Reserved on: November 18, 2025 Pronounced on: November 20, 2025 Uploaded on: November 20, 2025 * * * *

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Argued By:- Mr. A.P. Kaushal, Advocate for the appellant.

None for respondent No.1.

Mr. Ishan Kaushal, AAG, Punjab for respondent Nos.2 to 4.

DEEPAK GUPTA, J.

The plain"ffs, who are the appellants before this Court, have filed the present Regular Second Appeal challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Their suit for recovery of ₹2,50,000/- as compensa"on for the death of Mohd. Ishaq was decreed only against defendant No.1— Head Constable Pritam Singh, while the suit qua defendant Nos.2 to 4, namely the State of Punjab and its officials, was dismissed by the trial Court on 26.11.1991. The First Appellate Court, vide judgment dated 05.12.1994, upheld the said findings, giving rise to the present appeal.

2. The factual background emerging from the record is not in dis- pute. Mohd. Ishaq and his brother Mohd. Iqbal jointly ran a fruit shop at bus stand, Malerkotla. Head Constable Pritam Singh, while posted at Malerkotla, owed a sum of ₹500/- to Mohd. Ishaq for purchase of fruits. On 11.08.1987, a

tenced to life imprisonment.

3. The widow and mother of the deceased ins"tuted the present suit for recovery of ₹2,50,000/- as compensa"on against all four defendants i.e., the assailant - Head Constable, and the State authori"es. All defendants were proceeded ex parte.

4. On the basis of ex-parte evidence, the trial Court decreed the suit but only against defendant No.1, holding that the State could not be saddled with liability for the personal, illegal act of its employee. The appeal filed by the plain"ffs seeking a decree against the State authori"es was dis-

missed by the First Appellate Court.

5. In the present appeal, learned counsel for the appellants con- tends that defendant No.1 was admiBedly on official duty at the relevant "me and was using a State-issued weapon; thus, the State and its officers must be held jointly and severally liable. It is further urged that the First Ap- pellate Court failed to consider the appellants’ applica"on under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, through which they sought to produce cer"fied copies of the statements of witnesses in the criminal trial to show that Pritam Singh was performing official du"es at the "me of occurrence. According to the appel- lants, this addi"onal evidence was vital to establish the State's vicarious liab-

ility.

6. Opposing the appeal, learned State counsel submits that the concurrent findings suffer from no infirmity. It is argued that the act of murder commiBed by Head Constable Pritam Singh had no connec"on what-

soever with his official du"es and was purely personal in nature. The mere fact that he possessed a service weapon, or was in uniform cannot convert a personal vendeBa into an act aBributable to the State.

7. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions.

8. The First Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed re-appreci- a"on of evidence and has rightly noted that though Pritam Singh was on duty and carried an official sten gun, the incident arose exclusively from a personal dispute involving an unpaid private debt of ₹500/-. The deceased demanded payment of the money owed to him for fruits sold on credit, and it was this confronta"on that triggered the fatal aBack.

9. The First Appellate Court has specifically recorded that the ac- "on of Pritam Singh was a direct reac"on to the personal demand for repay- ment and had no nexus, direct or incidental, with his official responsibili"es of maintaining law and order or preven"ng crime. The weapon may have been issued for official du"es, but its misuse for seBling a personal score does not render the State vicariously liable. The doctrine of vicarious liability applies only when the tor"ous act is commiBed “in the course of employ- men