IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

Reserved on : 30.09.2025

Pronounced on : 22.12.2025

Uploaded on : 22.12.2025

Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced? No Whether full judgment is pronounced? Yes

Rachna Srivastava ...... Petitioner

versus

Sanjay Srivastava and another ...... Respondents

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN

Present: Petitioner in person.

Mr. Saurabh Bhatia, Advocate

for respondent No.1.

Mr. Kulwinder Singh, Advocate (through V.C.)

for respondent No.2.

****

PANKAJ JAIN, J.

1. Present revision petition is directed against order dated

01.04.2024 passed by JMIC Gurgaon.

2. The disputes relates to admission of personal diary of the petitioner in evidence. The Trial Court has allowed the diary to be tendered in evidence. The present revision petition has been preferred relying upon ratio of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of

Vibhor Garg vs. Neha reported as 2025 INSC 829

3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that diary in question being a privileged communication, cannot be allowed to be admitted in evidence in view of the provisions of Section 122 of the Evidence Act, 1872 re-enacted as Section 128 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,

2023.

4. The argument raised by counsel for the petitioner is misconceived. The personal diary of the complainant is being sought to be admitted in evidence. Section 122 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-

“122. Communications during marriage.––No person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

5. The issue is squarely covered by ratio of law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Verghese vs. T.J. Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876, wherein Supreme Court observed as under:- “14. A prima facie case was set up in the complaint by Verghese. That complaint has not been tried and we do not see how, without recording any evidence, the learned District Magistrate could pass any order discharging Ponnan. Section 122 of the Evidence Act only prevents disclosure in giving evidence in court of the communication made by the husband to the wife. If Rathi appears in the witness box to give evidence about the communications made to her husband, prima facie the communications may not be permitted to be deposed to or disclosed unless Ponnan consents. That does not, however, mean that no other evidence which is not barred under s. 122 of the Evidence Act or other provisions of the Act can be given.

15. In a recent judgment of the House of Lords Rumping v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1962) All E.R. 256 Rumping the mate of a Dutch ship was tried for murder committed on board the ship. Part of the evidence for the prosecution admitted at the trial consisted of a letter that Rumping had written to his wife in Holland which amounted to a confession. Rumping had written the letter on the day of the killing, and had handed the letter in a closed envelope to a member of the crew requesting him to post it as soon as the ship arrived at the port outside England. After the appellant was arrested, the member of the crew handed the envelope to the captain of the ship who handed it over to the police. The member of the crew, the captain and the translator of the letter gave evidence at the trial, but the wife was not called as witness. It was held that the letter was admissible in evidence. Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, Lord Hodson and Lord Pearce were of the view that at common law there had never been a separate principle or rule that communications between a husband and wife during marriage were inadmissible in evidence on the ground of public policy. Accordingly except where the spouse t