Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a bona fide and plausible explanation for the entire period of delay; mere ignorance of law or financial constraints without evidence do not constitute 'sufficient cause,' even in cases involving beneficial legislation.

DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL)

The present appeal has been filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensa"on awarded by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gurugram in respect of the death of Nasra, wife of Aasu, who lost her life in a motor vehicular accident dated 21.07.2019. The claim pe""on under Sec"on 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed by her husband and seven children against the driver, owner and insurer of the offending vehicle.

The learned Tribunal, vide award dated 26.09.2024, awarded compensa"on of ₹7,92,836/-, payable jointly and severally by the respondents along with interest.

The present appeal has been filed a5er a delay of 212 days and is accompanied by an applica"on bearing CM-16617-CII-2025 under Sec"on 5 of the Limita"on Act, 1963, seeking condona"on of the said delay.

Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the delay occurred on account of lack of awareness of legal technicali"es, dependence upon legal advice, and financial constraints. It is further pleaded that the applicants approached their counsel in the last week of July, 2025, whereupon they were advised to file the present appeal. The delay is stated to be uninten"onal. The applica"on is supported by the affidavit of Aasu, one of the appellants.

This Court has carefully considered the submissions and perused the record. The applica"on for condona"on of delay does not inspire confidence and is liable to be rejected.

It is se;led law that while courts adopt a liberal approach in ma;ers of condona"on of delay, par"cularly in cases arising out of beneficial legisla"on like the Motor Vehicles Act, the applicant is s"ll required to disclose a sufficient cause explaining the delay in a reasonable, plausible and bona fide manner. Mere asser"ons of ignorance of law or dependence on counsel, without explaining the en"tire period of delay, do not cons"tute sufficient cause.

In the present case, the award was pronounced on 26.09.2024. The appellants were duly represented by an Advocate before the Tribunal and were, therefore, presumed to be aware of the passing of the award. As per their own averments, they approached their counsel only in the last week of July, 2025, nearly ten months a5er the award. No explana"on whatsoever has been offered for this prolonged inac"on.

Further, the record reveals that the cer"fied copy of the award was applied for on 28.05.2025 and was made ready for delivery on 23.06.2025. Even therea5er, the appeal was not filed within a reasonable "me. The conduct of the appellants reflects gross negligence and lack of due diligence, rather than a bona fide inability to approach the Court within limita"on.

Financial difficulty, by itself, cannot jus"fy such an inordinate delay, par"cularly when no material has been placed on record to substan"ate the same. Equally, ignorance of law or alleged wrong advice of counsel, in the absence of suppor"ng par"culars, is not a legally acceptable explana"on.

The delay in the present case is substan"al and remains largely unexplained. In the absence of a sa"sfactory explana"on covering the en"tire period of delay, this Court is not inclined to exercise its discre"on in favour of the applicants.

Consequently, the applica"on bearing CM-16617-CII-2025 seeking condona"on of delay of 212 days is dismissed.

As a necessary corollary, the main appeal seeking enhancement of compensa"on, being barred by limita"on, is also dismissed.

All pending miscellaneous applica"on(s), if any, stand disposed of.