by Mohammad Baksh, the common ancestor of the par(cid:21)es. Upon his death, the land devolved upon his son Roshan, therea(cid:29)er upon his son Hayatoo, and finally upon Smt. Jano, widow of Hayatoo, who died issueless.

4. The plain(cid:21)ff pleaded that he, along with defendant Nos.4 and 5, being collaterals of the deceased husband, were the legal heirs of Smt. Jano. It was further pleaded that the par(cid:21)es belonged to the Mohammedan Gujjar community, were agriculturists by profession, and were governed by customary law in ma,ers of succession, aliena(cid:21)on, marriage and adop(cid:21)on. According to the plain(cid:21)ff, as per the prevailing custom, a widow or female inheri(cid:21)ng property from her husband acquires only a life estate, has no right of aliena(cid:21)on, and upon her death, the property reverts to the collaterals of the last male holder. On this premise, the plain(cid:21)ff challenged the registered gi(cid:29) deed dated 28.07.1977 executed by Smt. Jano in favour of defendants Nos.1 to 3 (appellants herein) as illegal, void and not binding, and sought possession a(cid:29)er se8ng aside the said aliena(cid:21)on.

5. Defence of Contes(cid:11)ng Defendants : Defendant Nos.1 to 3 contested the suit by denying the alleged custom in its pleaded form. While admi8ng that the par(cid:21)es were Mohammedans by religion and Gujjars by caste, it was specifically denied that there existed any custom restric(cid:21)ng a widow to a life estate. It was pleaded that the suit property was the self- acquired property of Hayatoo, and that Smt. Jano became the absolute owner thereof. The defendants further pleaded that Smt. Jano had full authority to gi(cid:29) the property and that the gi(cid:29) deed was executed in recogni(cid:21)on of the services rendered by them to her during her life(cid:21)me. The pedigree pleaded by the plain(cid:21)ff was also disputed, and the defendants asserted that the plain(cid:21)ff had no subsis(cid:21)ng right, (cid:21)tle or interest in the suit land.

6. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 supported the case of plain(cid:21)ff.

7. Issues and Trial Court Findings : On the basis of pleadings, the Trial Court framed necessary issues regarding (i) Nature of the suit property, (ii) Applicability and proof of custom, (iii) Validity of the gi(cid:29) deed, and (iv)

Limita(cid:21)on.

8. During evidence, though plain(cid:21)ff proved general custom as pleaded, but the defendants cited and proved several instances from the same Tehsil, where Muslim widows had alienated inherited property as absolute owners. Upon apprecia(cid:21)on of en(cid:21)re evidence led by the par(cid:21)es, the Trial Court recorded the material findings that the suit property was treated as non-ancestral in the hands of Hayatoo, a finding which a,ained finality; that Smt. Jano inherited the property upon the death of her husband; that though the par(cid:21)es were agriculturists and generally governed by custom, the specific custom pleaded by the plain(cid:21)ff was not proved; and that no cogent evidence was produced to establish that a Mohammedan widow of Gujjar caste held only a life estate. Consequently, Smt. Jano was held competent to execute the gi(cid:29) deed dated 28.07.1977. On these findings, the Trial Court dismissed the suit.

9. Findings of the First Appellate Court : The First Appellate Court reversed the judgment of trial court primarily on the reasoning that:

(cid:1) Punjab customary law governs all agricultural tribes irrespec(cid:21)ve of religion;

(cid:1) The plain(cid:21)ff had pleaded and proved the existence of custom through oral evidence;

(cid:1) A widow under customary law holds only a limited estate, even in non-

ancestral property;

(cid:1) The gi(cid:29) deed executed by Smt. Jano was therefore invalid.

The Appellate Court further held that proof of custom was not confined to documentary evidence like Wajib-ul-Arz or Riwaj-i-Am and could be established through oral tes(cid:21)mony alone.

10. Conten(cid:11)ons in Second