217 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-26261-2014(O&M)

Date of Decision:06.02.2026 SHIV SARAN -PETITIONER V/S THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL AND LABOUR COURT, LUDHIANA AND OTHERS -RESPONDENTS CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI Present: Ms. Harshmir Kaur Swaitch, Advocate for Mr. N.S.Swaitch, Advocate, for the petitioner.

Mr. Sanjay Tangri, Advocate, for respondent no.3.

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KULDEEP TIWARI, J.(Oral)

1. Through the instant petition, as cast under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the workman has challenged the legality of Award dated 03.04.2014 (Annexure P-9), wherethrough, the reference was answered against him by the learned Tribunal (respondent no.1), by observing that it is a case of voluntary abandonment of job, and not of termination, therefore, the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are not required to be complied with by respondent no.3-management.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner-workman, made earnest efforts before this Court to establish that it is not a case of voluntary abandonment of job by the petitioner-workman, rather, he was restrained from joining his duties. Therefore, the cessation of service amounted to termination by respondent no.3-management, requiring the compliance of mandatory provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the ID Act.

3. She further draws attention of this Court towards letters Ex.M1 and Ex.M2, which were relied upon the learned Tribunal concerned to conclude that its a case of voluntary abandonment of job, whereas the petitioner never received those letters owing to incorrect address mentioned thereon, which clearly reflects the intention of respondent no.3-management, that they wanted to terminate the services of the petitioner-workman, and those letters were issued only to create the ground to prove the voluntary abandonment of job.

4. She also submits that abandonment of service cannot be presumed, instead, the burden lies heavily upon respondent no.3- management to establish the same by leading cogent and convincing evidence, however, they miserably failed to discharge this burden, and therefore, the reference ought to have been answered in favour of the petitioner.

5. She next draws attention of this Court towards the cross- examination of MW1-Pritpal Krishan Beri, to submit that, he categorically admitted not possessing any evidence qua the receipt of Ex.M1 and Ex.M2 by the petitioner-workman, and that he was unable to answer, whether he is duly authorised by respondent no.3-management to depose.

6. She in addition submits that the petitioner-workman, himself stepped in the witness box as WW1, and denied the receipt of letters dated 17.08.2003 and 25.08.2005 (Ex.M1 and M2 respectively), therefore, the reference is required to be interfered with by this Court.

7. No other argument were raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-workman, before this Court.

8. Per contra learned counsel for respondent no.3-management submits that, as per the petitioner-workman, he was not allowed to join duties on dated 11.08.2005, however, he raised the demand for the first time on 20.12.2007, i.e. after a lapse of about 2 ½ years.

9. He further submits that even in cross-examination of the petitioner-workman, he categorically admitted the correctness of address mentioned at A upon the letter Ex.M1, and at B in Ex.M2, which is sufficient to establish that respondent no.3-workman, called him to join his duties twice, i.e. on 17.08.2003, and on 25.08.2005 respectively. Therefore, it is a case of voluntary abandonment of job, and not of termination from services by respondent no.3-management.

10. Finally, he submits that during the cross-examination of the petitioner-workman, respondent no.3-management offered him to join his duties, to which, he specifically, stated that he was not ready to join the duties without back-wages, which clearly establishes that respondent no.3-management never terminated his services, rather