3. The suit was contested by the defendants by pleading that the plain(cid:23)ff was the maternal uncle of defendant Nos.1 and 2. According to the defendants, their forefathers had allowed the father of the plain(cid:23)ff to occupy a por(cid:23)on of the suit property measuring 14 × 59 feet for residen(cid:23)al purposes. It was asserted that neither the father of the plain(cid:23)ff nor the plain(cid:23)ff himself had any right or (cid:23)tle in the suit property. It was further alleged that the plain(cid:23)ff had illegally removed malba from the suit property on 08.05.1992 regarding which an FIR had been registered. With these pleadings, dismissal of the suit was prayed for.

4. In the replica(cid:23)on, the plain(cid:23)ff reiterated the averments made in the plaint and denied the asser(cid:23)ons of the defendants.

5. Upon framing the necessary issues and apprecia(cid:23)on of the evidence on record, the trial Court held that the plain(cid:23)ff had failed to prove his (cid:23)tle over the suit property and further concluded that he had also failed to establish his possession. Consequently, the suit was dismissed on

12.09.1995.

6. The appeal preferred by the plain(cid:23)ff was also dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 10.11.1997. While affirming the findings of the trial Court, the First Appellate Court observed that the plain(cid:23)ff had failed to establish ownership over the suit property and was, therefore, not en(cid:23)tled to the relief of injunc(cid:23)on.

7. Assailing the aforesaid concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Courts below have misdirected themselves in law while declining the relief of injunc(cid:23)on. It is submi3ed that even if the plain(cid:23)ff failed to establish (cid:23)tle, yet once his possession over the suit property was admi3ed and stood established from evidence, he was en(cid:23)tled to protec(cid:23)on of such possession and could not be dispossessed except in due course of law. Learned counsel submits that the Courts below have erroneously declined the relief of injunc(cid:23)on solely on the ground that the plain(cid:23)ff failed to prove his (cid:23)tle. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed upon the judgments in Hukam Singh v. Tara Singh, 1992(2) RRR

358; Rame Gowda (D) by LRs v. Mr. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs and another, 2004(1) SCC 769; and Tarsem Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2005(3) RCR (Civil) 645.

8. None has appeared on behalf of the respondents at the (cid:23)me of hearing.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and having perused the record of the case, the following substan(cid:23)al ques(cid:23)on of law arises for considera(cid:23)on in the present appeal:

(cid:1) Whether a person in se3led possession of immovable property can be denied the relief of injunc(cid:23)on merely on the ground that he has failed to prove (cid:23)tle to the property?

10. The answer to the aforesaid ques(cid:23)on lies in the se3led principles governing suits for injunc(cid:23)on rela(cid:23)ng to immovable property. It is well established that possession of immovable property is itself a substan(cid:23)ve right which the law protects. Even a person, who is not able to establish (cid:23)tle may s(cid:23)ll be en(cid:23)tled to protec(cid:23)on of his possession against unlawful interference.

11. In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that law respects possession, even where there is no (cid:23)tle to support it and that a person in peaceful and se3led possession cannot be dispossessed otherwise than by due process of law. The Court further observed that even the righ=ul owner cannot dispossess a person in se3led possession by force and must take recourse to legal proceedings.

12. Similarly, in several earlier decisions including Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and others, (1968) 3 SCR 163, and Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs v. Mrs. Sbhobha