IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision:12.03.2026 M/S Rattan Constructions through Sh. Praveen Kumar Rattan .......Petitioner Versus PGIMER through the Director and another .......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI Present:- Mr. Satvinder Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Avinit Avasthi, Advocate for the respondents.

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JASGURPREET SINGH PURI J.(Oral)

1. The present is a petition filed under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), seeking appointment of sole arbitrator in the present case.

2. Written statement filed on behalf of respondents is taken on record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there exists an agreement between the parties vide Annexure P-1, which contains an arbitration clause at Clause No.25 providing for appointment of a sole arbitrator. He submitted that as per the said clause, the sole arbitrator is to be appointed by the Chief Engineer, CPWD which is otherwise impermissible in law because of conflict of interest in view of Section 12(5)

of the Act. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and another v. HSCC (India) Limited, (2020) 20 SCC 760, wherein it has been held that unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator by one of the parties is impermissible in law. He further submitted that since a dispute arose between the parties, the petitioner served a notice dated 28.07.2025 upon the respondents vide Annexure P-8 for invoking the arbitration clause but no response was received from the respondents. Therefore, he submitted that this Hon’ble Court may appoint a sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-PGI submitted that there is no dispute regarding the existence of the agreement (Annexure P-1) or the arbitration clause contained therein and there is also no dispute regarding the invocation of the arbitration clause by the petitioner by issuing notice (Annexure P-8) upon the respondents, to which the respondents did not reply. He further submitted that the objection of the respondents is that the claim of the petitioner is time barred and therefore, constitutes a non-arbitrable dispute and cannot be referred to arbitration.

Accordingly, the present petition may be dismissed.

5. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

6. The existence of the agreement containing the arbitration clause, as well as the invocation of the said clause by issuance of notice, has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents. The only objection raised by the respondents is that the claim of the petitioner is time barred.

7. The aforesaid objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents is not sustainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “SBI General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Krish Spinning”, 2024 SCC Online SC 1754 and also another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In Re” (2024) 6 SCC 1 and therefore, the law is no longer res integra. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in SBI General Insurance Company Limited’s case (Supra) is reproduced as under:-

“110. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the requirement that the agreement should be in writing.

111. The use of the term ‘examination’ under Section 11(6-A) as distinguished from the use of the term ‘rule’ under Section 16 implies that the scope of enquiry under section 11(6-A) is limited to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration agreement, and does not include a contested or labori