IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (109) Date of Decision:-11.03.2026

1. FAO No. 7114 of 2025 (O&M)

Asha … Appellant Versus Insaf And Another … Respondents AND

2. FAO No. 7123 of 2025 (O&M)

Asha … Appellant Versus Insaf And Another … Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL Present:- Ms. Megna Nehra, Advocate for the appellant.

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VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J. (Oral)

1. The present order shall dispose of two connected appeals i.e. FAO- 7114-2025 and FAO-7123-2025, as both arise out of the same award dated 06.01.2024 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nuh, and involve identical questions of law and fact. For the sake of convenience, the facts are being noticed from FAO-7114-2025.

2. The both appeals have been filed with an inordinate delay of 614 days Along with the appeals, the appellants have filed applications (CM-25525/CII OF 2025 and CM-25531/CII OF 2025 in respective FAOs) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of the said delay.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the delay in filing the present appeals occurred due to unavoidable circumstances and was neither intentional nor deliberate. It is contended that the appellant is ill-informed persons and was unaware of the prescribed period of limitation. It is further argued that the appellants could not file the present appeals in time as an application for correction of the award had been filed before the learned Tribunal, since interest and pay-and-recovery rights had not been granted. It is, thus, prayed that as the appeals arise out of a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, the delay deserves to be condoned in the interest of substantial justice so that the matter may be decided on merits.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have carefully perused the applications seeking condonation of delay as well as the paper-books of both appeals.

5. Upon a careful examination of the record, this Court finds that the explanation furnished in support of the applications for condonation of delay is vague, general and wholly insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The delay in the present case is of 614 days, which is inordinate. The explanation furnished in the application does not constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of the law of limitation. Merely stating that the appellant is ill-informed persons or were unaware of the limitation period cannot be accepted as a valid ground for condoning such a long delay. Likewise, the plea that an application for correction of the award had been filed before the learned Tribunal also does not satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. The applicants have failed to place on record any cogent or convincing material to justify the prolonged inaction.

6. It is well-settled that the condonation of delay is not a matter of right, and the discretionary power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be exercised only when the applicant satisfactorily demonstrates, through cogent, credible, and duly substantiated material, the existence of a bona fide and sufficient cause that genuinely prevented the timely institution of the proceedings. The explanation must be reasonable, convincing, and indicative of due diligence throughout the period of delay. In the present matter, however, the reasons put forth in the present application are vague, inconsistent and reflect casual and negligent conduct and do not meet the threshold of “sufficient cause” for condoning an inordinate delay of 614 days. No bona fide or unavoidable circumstance has been shown which prevented the applicant from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the appellants have failed to establish any sufficient cause warranting condonation of such an extraordinary delay.

7. Reference may be made to the recent j