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2026 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 6079

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
LT COL DEVENDER SINGH – Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS – Respondent



129 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision: 05.03.2026 LT COL DEVENDER SINGH ...Appellant Vs.

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHIT KAPOOR Present: Mr. Navdeep Singh, Sr. Advocate with Ms. Roopan Atwal, Advocate Mr. Rajat Chauhan, Advocate for the appellant.

Mr. Ashish Rawal, Advocate for the respondent-UOI.

***

A SHWANI KUMAR MISHRA , J. (Oral)

1. Learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant only on the ground that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court. For coming to such conclusion, the learned Single Judge has observed that mere inter se communication between different offices would not constitute any part of cause of action.

2. It is not in dispute that the appellant was granted contractual employment by the authorities based at Chandimandir Cantt., Panchkula, Haryana. His services have been brought to an end by the same office. It is therefore submitted that mere fact that the appellant was working at Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh would not be material, since a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court. Submission is that once the competent authority for appointing the appellant and for his termination is at Panchkula, Haryana, any action of such authority would constitute a part of cause of action.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent does not dispute that the appointing authority of the appellant is stationed at Panchkula, Haryana. The order of termination of his services have also been passed by authority at Haryana.

4. Considering the undisputed position that the appointing authority of the appellant is stationed at Panchkula and the impugned order has also been passed by authority stationed at Panchkula, we find that a part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court notwithstanding the fact that actual place of working of appellant was at Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh. In that view of the matter, we cannot endorse the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court.

5. In 'Nandram vs. Garware Polyster Limited', 2016(6) SCC 290, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that where the order of termination is passed, it would constitute a part of cause of action at such place. Para 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court is relied upon, which reads as under:-

"4. Though the learned counsel on both sides had addressed in detail on several issues, we do not think it necessary to go into all those aspects mainly because in our view they are only academic. In the background of the factual matrix, the undisputed position is that the appellant was employed by the Company in Aurangabad, he was only transferred to Pondicherry, the decision to close down the unit at Pondicherry was taken by the Company at Aurangabad and consequent upon that decision only the appellant was terminated. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no cause of action at all in Aurangabad. The decision to terminate the appellant having been taken at Aurangabad necessarily part of the cause of action has arisen at Aurangabad. We have no quarrel that the Labour Court, Pondicherry is within its jurisdiction to consider the case of the appellant, since he has been terminated while he was working at Pondicherry. But that does not mean that the Labour Court in Aurangabad within whose jurisdiction the management is situated and where the management has taken the decision to close down the unit at Pondicherry and pursuant to which the appellant was terminated from service also does not have the jurisdiction."

6. In 'Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India and another', 2004(6) SCC 254, also the Supreme Court has observed as under:-

"27. When an order, however, is passed by a court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under prov

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