IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-45774-2024 in/and CRM-A-1518-2024 (O&M)

Date of Decision: 08.01.2025 Malkiat Singh .. Applicant Vs.

State of Punjab and another ..Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present: Mr. Mohd. Jameel, Advocate for the applicant.

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S UMEET GOEL , J. (Oral)

1. The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant seeking condonation of delay of 198 days in filing the application seeking leave to appeal. Leave to appeal has been sought for by the applicant against the judgment dated 13.02.2024 passed by the ld. JMIC, Malerkotla, wherein respondent No.2 was acquitted from accusation in the complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant, while seeking grant of prayer for condonation of delay of 198 days, has argued that the delay has occurred as the applicant had applied certified copy of the judgment dated 13.02.2024 passed against him on 20.02.2024 and the same was delivered on 29.02.2024. Thereafter on 12.08.2024, the applicant had engaged the counsel to file the instant application seeking leave to appeal before this Court and then he came to know that limitation period for filing the appeal has already expired. Learned counsel for the applicant has further argued that the circumstances of the case indicate that the delay in filing the application seeking leave to appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate hence delay deserves to be condoned.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and have perused the paper-book.

4. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of this Court passed in CRR(F)-1844-2023 titled as Deepak vs. Noori and another decided on 29.02.2024; relevant whereof reads as under:- "8. As a sequel to above-said discussion, the following principles of law emerge:

A liberal approach, undoubtedly, ought to be accorded to a plea for condonation of delay made under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1969 so as to further the cause of substantial justice. The concept of substantial justice essentially includes in itself the desirability of adjudication of a claim of the litigant on merits thereof rather than rejection of the same, at the threshold, on account of being barred by limitation. However, adoption of such liberal approach cannot be stretched to mean that a prayer (for condonation of delay) ought to be granted sans reasonable explanation therefor. An applicant (seeking condonation of delay) has to bring forward cogent, credible and lucid reason(s) to substantiate such a plea. In case such reason(s) is not scrutable, a Court would well be within its discretion to decline such plea (for condonation of delay). In other words, inexplicable delay ought not to be condoned.

II.A Court ought to grant an application seeking condonation of delay when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to such applicant and/or such delay has occurred on account of circumstances beyond reasonable control of such applicant.

III. It is not the length of delay (sought to be condoned) but explanation thereof which is relevant for consideration by a Court. IV. Law of limitation does not require an applicant (seeking condonation of delay) to furnish an exhaustive explanation on 'day to-day basis’ for such delay. A Court while dealing with a plea for condonation of delay need not undertake such a pedantic approach.

V. In appropriate cases, a Court may consider imposing costs while granting an application for condonation of delay. However, the quantification of costs so imposed, must reflect the same being commensurate to the lis in issue as also attending circumstances therein.

VI. The factum; of non-applicant(s) or even strangers having altered their position(s) relying upon the applicant not having filed an appeal/revision etc. within stipulated time and resultant effects thereof;

will indubitably be a pertinent factor for consideration of a plea for

condonation of delay.

VII. A p