IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH DATE OF DECISION : JANUARY 09, 2025 M/S HAQIQAT RICE MILL AND OTHERS …APPELLANTS Versus (cid:1)(cid:2)(cid:3)(cid:4)(cid:5)(cid:6)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:9)(cid:5)(cid:9)(cid:10)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:12)(cid:13)(cid:12)(cid:14)(cid:7)(cid:8)(cid:2)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:14)(cid:12)(cid:10)(cid:8)(cid:7)(cid:11)(cid:15)(cid:16)(cid:1)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:14)(cid:9)(cid:18)(cid:17)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:18)(cid:7)(cid:5)(cid:3)(cid:15)(cid:9)(cid:19)(cid:10)(cid:16)

(cid:7) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) …Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Present : Mr. G.C. Dhuriwala, Advocate for the appellants.

Mr. Raj Partap Singh Brar, Advocate for the respondents.

LAPITA BANERJI, J.(ORAL)

This is an appeal preferred against the order dated August 21, 2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘1996 Act’).

2. Vide the impugned order, the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was dismissed on the ground of limitation. It was held that the burden was entirely upon the miller-respondents in the arbitration proceedings and the appellants herein to show that the award was not received by the miller-respondents within the time limit to prefer the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The learned Additional District Judge was of the opinion that since the miller-respondent in the arbitration proceedings had raised the contention that the award was received much after the expiry of the time period for filing of the application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, the burden of proof was on miller-respondents to prove that the same was received on the date when they were agitating to have received the same.

3. Instead of corroborating its argument with documentary evidence to show that the award was received beyond the period of challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the miller-respondents in the Arbitration had tried to shift the burden of proof on the claimants and argued that it was incumbent upon them to show that the award was received by the miller-respondents after the stipulated period for filing of the application for setting aside the ex parte award. Therefore, Additional District Judge, Chandigarh came to the finding that the delay in filing the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act could not be condoned and the Section 34 application was clearly barred by limitation. She also recorded that no ground had been taken in Section 34 application that the miller-respondents had received the said award after statutory stipulated time for filing of the application, 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that it was the duty of the claimants to show when and how the award was received by the miller-respondents.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants in the arbitration proceedings and the respondents herein submits that no ground had been taken in the Section 34 application to show that the award was received beyond the time stipulated for filing of Section 34 application. Furthermore, no application for condonation of delay has been filed by the appellants.

6. This Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.

7. It is apparent that no ground had taken in the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act filed by the miller-respondents-appellants herein to contend that the award was received beyond the stipulated time for filing the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Furthermore, no application for condonation of delay in filing of the Section 34 application has been preferred by the appellants.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants refers to judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in Food Corporation of India Vs. Surendra, Devendra and Mahendra Transport Co. reported in 2003(4) SCC 80 and Vishwanath Sood Vs. Union of India and another repor