2024 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 27980
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
M.P. POORAV KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN CO. LTD. AND ANR – Appellant
Versus
M/S JAY BEE INDUSTRIES AND ANR – Respondent
Sr. No.107 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision : 28.01.2025 M.P. Poorav Kshetra Vidhyut Vitran Co. Ltd. and another …Appellants Versus M/s Jay Bee Industries and another …Respondents CORAM : HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPITA BANERJI Present : Mr. Nikhil Handa, Advocate and Mr. Shailender Kashyap, Advocate for the appellants.
Ms. Geetika Sharma, Advocate for Mr. Sourabh Goel, Advocate, for respondent No.1.
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LAPITA BANERJI, J. (Oral)
CM-10189-CII-2024 This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 58 days in preferring the appeal.
For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and delay of 58 days in preferring the appeal is condoned.
Main case Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that vide impugned order dated November 30, 2023, the Additional District Judge, Panchkula committed a manifest illegality by dismissing the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the 1996 Act’). Before the learned Additional District Judge, an award dated April 3, 2019 was assailed by the appellants.
2. It is contended before this Court that the appellant No.1 is a Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Company and the provisions of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED)
should have been followed.
3. Reliance is placed on a decision passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in “Indian Oil Corporation Limited Vs. Haryana Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council, Chandigarh, Haryana and another” dated August 1, 2023 to submit that the learned Arbitrator under the said Act could not have passed an enforceable award. He only had the power to send his award as a report to the MSME Council and it was for the Council to pass an enforceable award.
4. To the mind of this Court, it is important to take into consideration the following dates.
5. The award was dated April 3, 2019 and the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was instituted on August 08, 2019. The same was decided on November 30, 2023.
6. From the perusal of the impugned judgment, it does not appear to this Court that the decision of the Coordinate Bench dated August 1, 2023 was brought to the notice of the learned Additional District Judge.
7. The principles of law governing applications under Section 34 of 1996 Act, are well settled. Even if an award suffered from an error of law but unless that error offends the Public Policy of India, meaning thereby, unless there is an infraction of fundamental policy of Indian Law including a law meant to serve public interest or public good, the award could not be set aside. A beneficial reference can be made to the scope of the 34 proceedings in the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in “OPG Power Generation Private Limited Vs. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Private Limited and another” 2024 SCC online SC 2600. The relevant extract is set out herein below:-
“36 What is clear from above is that for an award to be against public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve public interest or public good.”
8. The scope of interference in Section 37 of the 1996 Act is extremely limited and the court cannot go beyond the stipulations of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. A beneficial reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in “Konkan Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking” (2023) 9 SCC 85. The relevant extract of the same is reproduced hereunder:-
“14. Analysis: At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified by this in MMTC Ltd Vs. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the Act. Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an