IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision: 24.02.2025 PRABHJOT KAUR ……Appellant Versus VIKRAM SINGH …..Respondent CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUKHVINDER KAUR Present:- Mr. Ramandeep, Advocate for the appellant.

SUDHIR SINGH, J.

CM-3833-CII-2025 For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and the delay of 15 days in filing the appeal is condoned, subject to all just exceptions.

FAO-1278-2025 Challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and decree dated 23.10.2024 passed by learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Patiala, Camp Court Samana (for short the ‘Family Court’), whereby the petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’) was allowed and the marriage between the parties was dissolved by decree of divorce on the ground of mutual consent.

2. Challenge is also to the order dated 23.10.2024 vide which an application filed by the appellant-wife for withdrawal of her consent was dismissed.

3. The aforesaid petition under Section 13-B of the Act had been filed by the parties for dissolution of their marriage by way of a mutual consent. The first motion statements of the parties were recorded on 17.07.2024. Thereafter, an application for waiving off the statutory period of six months was allowed vide order dated 29.08.2024. On the said date itself, the second motion statements of the parties were recorded whereafter, the case was fixed for consideration and pronouncement of the order for 11.09.2024. The appellant filed an application on 11.09.2024 for withdrawal of her consent, which was dismissed by learned Family Court, vide an order of even date i.e., 23.10.2024. The marriage between the parties, as noticed above was dissolved by a decree of divorce dated 23.10.2024 by mutual consent.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the appellant-wife had moved an application for withdrawal of her consent for grant of divorce by mutual consent well before the pronouncement of the judgment and decree and, therefore, the impugned order whereby such application has been dismissed by learned Family Court is untenable in the eyes of law. It is also argued that as a consequence thereof, the impugned judgment and decree is also liable to be set aside. It is further argued that as per the settled law, any of the parties to the petition under Section 13-B of the Act can move an application for withdrawal of his/her consent before the pronouncement of the judgment and decree and, thus, the impugned order and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Court, are liable to be set aside. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Sureshta Devi Vs. Om Parkash

1991(1)PLR 411.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and have also gone through the impugned judgment & decree and the impugned order passed by the learned Family Court.

6. The only question that arises for consideration by this Court is whether the impugned judgment & decree and the order passed by learned Family Court, require any interference.

7. There is no debate regarding the settled decision of law as regards the withdrawal of the consent by any of the spouses in respect of the petition filed under Section 13-B of the Act prior to pronouncement of the judgment and decree to be passed by the concerned Court. However, in the instant case, it may be noticed that the petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed on 10.07.2024. The first motion statements were recorded on 17.07.2024. The case was adjourned to 22.01.2025 for second motion statements. However, on 29.08.2024 the parties had filed an application for waiving off the period of 06 month on the ground that there were many marriage proposals for the appellant-wife and there was much haste on the part of the persons giving said proposals. The appellant-wife had placed on record her air tickets to show urgency of moving the applic