IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

220 CRM-A-1764-2023 (O&M)

DATE OF DECISION:16.05.2025 JAGRAJ SINGH ……..APPLICANT/APPELLANT Versus GURJIT SINGH ……..RESPONDENT CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL Present: Mr. G.S.Saini, Advocate for the applicant/appellant. Mr. R.S.Sekhon, Advocate for the respondent.

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SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J

1. The present appeal petition has been filed, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 315 days in filing the appeal, against the order dated 4.11.2022, whereby the complaint got dismissed under Section 256 Cr.P.C.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant submits that the delay of 315 days has occurred due to the bonafide human mistake and was neither intentional nor deliberate. He further submits that matrimonial dispute of his son was going on with his wife and the appellant was nominated as an accused in the said case and was therefore, busy in pursuing it.

3. Heard.

4. It is to be borne in mind that the power given to the Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay has to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood and delay in filing an appeal ought not to be excused unless there are special circumstances. One of the essentials while adjudicating upon application of limitation is that the applicant has to show sufficient cause as to why the court should allow the application as the power to condone the delay is a discretionary power. While dealing with an application under Section 5 of the Limitations Act, the Courts are always influenced by the considerations whether the extensions of the period of the limitation is likely to affect the rights which have come to vest in the opposite party with an efflux of time.

5. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals.

6. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that the court has to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.

7. The Apex court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd A.I.R. 1962 SC 361 has emphasized that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party.

8. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. A.I.R.1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

9. Further reference can be drawn upon the lately dictum of Apex court in “Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241” wherein it has been observed that Equity