2025 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 13936
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
MANDIP SINGH @ MANDEEP SINGH – Appellant
Versus
D.B CORPORATION PVT. LTD. AND ANR – Respondent
AT CHANDIGARH.
Date of Decision: 26.08.2025.
Mandip Singh @ Mandeep Singh ....Appellant.
VERSUS D.B. Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and another ....Respondents.
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA ---
Present: Mr. Bhrigu Dutt Sharma, Advocate for the appellant.
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ANUPINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (Oral)
CM-2775-LPA-2025 Exemption application is allowed, as prayed for.
CM-2776-LPA-2025 This application is for condonation of delay of 52 days in filing the appeal.
Heard. For the reasons stated in the application, the same is allowed and delay of 52 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
LPA-1127-2025 The appellant has challenged the order of the Single Bench dated
19.12.2024, whereby the writ petition bearing CWP No.13757 of 2018 preferred by respondent No.1-Corporation against the award of the Labour Court has been disposed of in terms of order dated 19.12.2024 passed in the connected writ petition bearing CWP No.10543 of 2017. In CWP No.10543 of 2017 an amount of Rs.2 Lakhs has been ordered to be paid to the appellant.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that once the order of termination was found to be bad in law, the appellant ought to have been reinstated with continuity of service. In the alternative, he has argued that the Single Bench has erroneously recorded the concession of the counsel confining the prayer to payment of compensation, but the concession made by counsel was only in CWP No.10543 of 2017 and no such concession was made in the instant case. He has relied upon upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Municipal Council, Dina Nagar vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur and another, 2014 (70) RCR (Civil) 119 wherein it has been held that compensation of Rs.1 Lakh for each completed year of service would be adequate.
3. Heard.
4. The appellant, who was working as a Page Maker with respondent No.1, was dismissed from service on 20.02.2009. He was drawing a salary of Rs.6100/- per month. He had raised an industrial dispute and vide Award dated 08.11.2017, the Industrial Tribunal had directed reinstatement of the appellant with continuity in service and full back wages after arriving at the conclusion that the termination was in violation of the procedure set out under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Although learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Single Bench has relied upon the concession made by the counsel for the appellant in another case, but we find that no application was preferred by the appellant for modification/ recalling of the impugned judgment if there was such an error in the order.
5. Be that as it may, it has been held by the Supreme Court that it is not necessary to direct reinstatement with continuity of service in the event of termination of the services being found to be in violation of the procedure laid down under the Industrial Disputes Act. Reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177 wherein it has been held that it is open to the Court to mould the relief and direct monetary compensation instead of reinstatement in service. It has been further held that the reinstatement is not to be granted mechanically even if termination is found to be illegal. The relevant extract of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-
“33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is