IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CM-10756-C-2025 in (110 RSA-3038-2025 (O&M)

Date of Decision:-02.09.2025 JAGIR SINGH … Applicant/Appellant Versus GURDEV SINGH AND ANOTHER ... Respondents ****

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL Present:- Mr. Aman P. Jain, Advocate for the applicant/appellant.

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VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)

CM-10756-C-2025

1. The appeal before this Court has been filed with a delay of 1,022 days. The applicant/appellant seeks condonation of such delay on the ground that due to the intervention of certain individuals, the non-applicant/respondents abstained from interfering with the possession of the applicant/appellant, which caused the applicant/appellant to desist from prosecuting the matter any further within the stipulated period. It is only upon the recent resumption of interference by the non-applicants/respondents in the appellant’s possession that the present appeal has been instituted. The application is accompanied by an affidavit affirmed by Sh. Jagir Singh, attesting to the facts stated therein.

2. Section 3 of the Limitation Act lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to the effect that ‘sufficient cause’ having been shown for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation, appeal can be entertained beyond the period of limitation. “Sufficient cause” has received a liberal interpretation and it is considered that the approach of the Courts should be justice-oriented and the causes should be decided on merits rather than on technicalities. The question with regard to interpretation of Section 5 of Limitation Act was elaborately discussed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs.The Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286, para No.9 to 26 of that judgment is reproduced as under:-

“9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.

10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“3. Bar of limitation.- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”

11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.

12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of