IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-24742-2025 Date of Decision : 24.09.2025 AVTAR SINGH AND OTHERS .....Petitioners VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI Present : Mr. Raj Kaushik, Advocate, for the petitioner.

KULDEEP TIWARI . J.(Oral)

1. Through the instant writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, a prayer is made for issuance of a mandamus upon respondents to divert contributions made by the petitioners to the Employees Pension Scheme 1995 w.e.f. 16.11.1995 on the basis of actual wages drawn etc. without any upper cap with regard to the petitioners and then grant the arrears @ 18% per annum, in view of the settled law laid down by this High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

2. This Court vide order 02.09.2025, this Court had passed the hereinafter extracted order:-

“1. The learned counsel for the petitioners seeks an adjournment, thereby enabling him to address arguments as to how, after 35 years of the cause of action having accrued and especially when most of the petitioners retired 30 years ago, the instant writ petition is maintainable.

2. List on 24.09.2025.”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, instead of filing an additional affidavit, for explaining the reasons for such huge delay in approaching this Court, has made submission only to the extent that some of the employees were granted relief by this Court in the year 2020-21, therefore, the delay would not come in the way of the petitioners. Further, the Union of India, on their behalf had also made a request in the year 2018, therefore, filing petition in the year 2025, may not be considered as delay. He further submits that since the petitioners have served legal notice, therefore, the delay would not come in their way. He also submits that it is an established law that in case of a dispute with regard to pension, the delay is not a legal impediment.

4. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners at length, and finds that, far from assigning any plausible reason, no reason whatsoever has been provided in the petition to justify the delay. The only justification offered for filing the instant petition at such a belated stage is that some similarly situated employees had earlier approached this Court, and were granted the relief sought by them. This submission is untenable. Those who were vigilant in asserting their rights were rightly granted relief, but the petitioners, who remained dormant for nearly 35 years, and even after their retirement, have only now approached this Court, after a delay of approximately 10 years. Such inordinate delay cannot be condoned.

5. At this juncture, it is noteworthy to record that with the efflux of time, the law of limitation has evolved considerably, and it has been accepted that it may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigours. The Court shall not use its powers to extend the limitation on equitable grounds. The provisions of the Limitation Act may not be liberally construed, which will frustrate its very purpose. The Court has to adopt a pragmatic and rational approach, while dealing with the contention of delay. The Court has to delve into the issue, as to whether, the delay has been validly explained, and only thereafter, shall arrive at a decision, which, otherwise has attained finality.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, through a pronouncement in N. Balakrishnan v. `M. Krishnamurty AIR 1998 SC 3222, while putting in a narrow compass, interprets that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim reipublicae interest ut sits finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Further, the rules of limitations are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, but to ensure that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics and avail their remedy promptly. The relevant observ