IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Reserve:-25.09.2025 Date of Pronouncement:- 09.10.2025 PEPSU ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION & ANR ......Appellants vs.

PANESARY DEVI AND ANOTHER ......Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA Present: Mr. Lakhwinder Singh Sidhu, Advocate for the appellants.

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SUDEEPTI SHARMA J. CM No. 14356-CII-2025

1. The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC is filed for condonation of delay of 102 days in filing the appeal.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant-appellant at length and, with his able assistance, carefully perused the whole file of this case.

3. Before examining the merits of the present application, it is pertinent to note the settled position that delay is not to be condoned as a matter of generosity or benevolence; the pursuit of substantial justice cannot come at the cost of prejudice to the opposite party.

4. It is well settled by catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality but has substantive value, being founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 seeks to ensure that litigants approach the Court within a reasonable period and do not sleep over their rights. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers the Court to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown, such discretion is neither automatic nor to be exercised as a matter of course. Reference at this stage can be made to judgment of Apex court in Maniben Devraj Shah v Municipal corporation of Brigham Mumbai 2012(5) SCC 157,wherein it is held as under:

“The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

5. Similarly, in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363, Hon’ble the Supreme Court reiterated that a liberal or justice- oriented approach cannot be invoked to override the substantive law of limitation. The Apex Court observed that expressions such as “liberal approach” and “substantial justice” cannot be stretched to obliterate the mandate of limitation prescribed by statute.

6. More recently, in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 INSC 672, Hon’ble the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, reaffirmed that although Courts may lean in favour of advancing substantial justice, such indulgence cannot be extended unless the applicant establishes a legally sufficient and satisfactorily explained cause for the delay.

The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduce as thus :

31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona-fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.”

7. Again, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104, Hon’ble the Supreme Court recently reiterated that for seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the applicant must explain the delay for the entire period commencing from the date on which the limitation begins to run until the actual date of filing. It has been categorically held