IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

278 Date of Decision: 30.10.2025 Ravinder Kumar ... Applicant Versus Manoj Kumar ... Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA Present: Mr. Parveen Sharma, Advocate, for the applicant.

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MANISHA BATRA , J. (Oral)

1. The instant application has been filed by the applicant under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) seeking grant of special leave to file appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 22.03.2024, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panipat in Criminal complaint titled as Ravinder Kumar v. Manoj Kumar, filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ‘N. I. Act’) whereby the respondent/accused had been acquitted for commission of aforementioned offences.

2. Today learned counsel for the applicant, while relying upon a recent pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208, has submitted that by directing the present application as an appeal, filed under Sections 372 of Cr.P.C. (which is pari materia with Section 413 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the same be sent to appropriate Court for its disposal.

3. In M/s. Celestium Financial’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has interpreted Sections 372 and 378(4) of Cr.P.C. and has observed that the victim in a private complaint case has a right to file an appeal, under Section 372 of Cr.P.C., against the order of acquittal before the Court of Sessions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

“7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows:

Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonoured.

Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal.

Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an appeal. On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, it is not always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC would be contrary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.

Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant.

Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its