IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (101)

CRA-S-3086-2025 (O&M)

Date of Decision:-07.11.2025 Mukesh Kumar Singh ……Appellant Versus State of Haryana and another ……Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK JAIN ****

Present: Mr. Kumar Gaurav, Advocate for the appellant.

Ms. Swati Batra, Senior DAG, Haryana.

ALOK JAIN, J. (Oral)

1. The present appeal has been filed raising challenge to the order dated 31.07.2025, passed by learned District and Sessions Court, Jhajjar, whereby, the application for anticipatory bail filed by the appellant was dismissed.

2. At the outset, a preliminary issue was raised with regard to the maintainability of the present appeal, i.e., how a second appeal would be maintainable. In response, learned counsel for the appellant, after drawing attention to the provisions of Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, submitted that the present appeal would not amount to a second appeal, as it arises from a fresh order passed on the rejection of a subsequent anticipatory bail application. It is further submitted that the law on the subject has been settled by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in “Dharam Singh Parihar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others”, CRA No. 9530 of 2024, wherein it was held that if a fresh bail application is preferred on account of change in circumstances and a fresh order is passed, the litigant cannot be left remediless and would be entitled to file an appeal thereafter.

3. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and has contended that the Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, in “Dushyant Pandey v. State of Chhattisgarh”, Criminal Appeal No. 1797 of 2022, has categorically held that a second appeal against rejection of anticipatory bail is not maintainable. It is further submitted that the view taken in Dushyant Pandey (supra) has also been affirmed in Dharam Singh Parihar (supra), and therefore, the present appeal is not maintainable in the eyes of law.

4. On merits, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there has been a change in circumstances that on an earlier occasion, when the investigation was pending, the appellant had joined the investigation and he was initially granted the protection, however, subsequently, the said petition came to be dismissed. The appellant has filed a second application for anticipatory bail on the ground that no further investigation is required, and the investigating agency is now at liberty to file the charge-sheet. It is further submitted that the custody of the appellant is being sought only for the purpose of filing the charge-sheet, and therefore, his arrest at this stage would serve no fruitful purpose.

5. However, learned State counsel submits that the mere filing of the charge-sheet would not constitute a change in circumstances. It is argued that if every procedural stage of the investigation or trial is treated as a change in circumstance, it would result in repeated filing of anticipatory bail applications, as the proceedings naturally evolve from one stage to another. The change of stage, by itself, cannot be construed as a change in circumstance warranting a fresh consideration of bail; rather, the matter has to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

6. Learned State counsel further submits that on the earlier occasion, when the appellant was granted interim protection, his appeal was subsequently dismissed on the ground that he was not cooperating with the investigation and had, in fact, tampered with the evidence by destroying a second mobile phone which allegedly contained obscene photographs and videos of the victim. It is contended that granting any concession to the appellant at this stage would only encourage further tampering with the evidence and adversely affect the course of justice.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties at lengt