AT CHANDIGARH (113 Date of Decision:-10.11.2025 Rajesh … Appellant Versus Pyare Lal and Others ... Respondents ****

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL Present:- Mr. Rajneesh Chadwal, Advocate for the appellant.

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VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)

1. The present Regular Second Appeal (here-in-after referred to as “RSA”) has been instituted after an inordinate delay of 857 days. Alongside the main appeal, the applicant has preferred an application bearing CM- 14009-C-2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, praying for condonation of the aforesaid delay. The applicant asserts that the delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to negligence, but was instead the result of circumstances stated to be beyond his control, which purportedly impeded the timely filing of the appeal.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the delay of 857 days stands fully explained, arising from circumstances genuinely beyond the applicant’s control and untainted by any deliberate inaction or negligence. It is submitted that the demise of the applicant’s grandfather (original defendant), during the pendency of the first appeal disrupted the continuity of the proceedings and left the applicant an illiterate rural resident with limited means unaware of the appellate outcome and of the necessity to pursue further legal remedies. Learned counsel further asserts that the applicant, being the family member in actual possession of the suit property, became cognizant of the need to approach this Court only when attempts were made to interfere with his possession. Thereafter, the applicant is stated to have acted with promptitude in securing relevant documents and legal advice. It is further asserted that the aforesaid explanation is coherent, comprehensive, duly supported by affidavit, and sufficiently accounts for the entire period of delay. Learned counsel concludes that, in view of the substantial rights at stake and the arguable issues raised, the delay merits condonation to facilitate adjudication on the merits.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and have meticulously examined the paper-book, including the pleadings and documents placed on file for consideration.

4. Upon examining the paper-book and hearing learned counsel at length, this Court finds that the grounds urged in support of condonation are vague, insufficient, and fall short of establishing “sufficient cause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. General assertions of illiteracy, financial hardship, rural background, or ignorance of legal remedies cannot, in themselves, furnish a legally sustainable basis for condoning an inordinate delay of 857 days. No material has been brought on record to demonstrate diligence, nor is there any satisfactory explanation covering the substantial period of delay. The contention that another legal heir pursued the earlier proceedings does not absolve the applicant of the obligation to act with reasonable promptness.

4.1. The explanation offered is neither persuasive nor supported by cogent evidence. Given the magnitude of the delay, strict scrutiny is warranted, and the applicant has failed to discharge the burden of establishing compelling or unavoidable circumstances that prevented timely institution of the RSA. Invocations of potential prejudice or the existence of arguable legal issues cannot supplant the statutory requirement of demonstrating sufficient cause for condonation.

4.2. In this regard, reference may be made to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah (since deceased), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, wherein the Court emphatically reiterated that condonation of delay is not to be granted as a matter of course. The Court underscored that a party seeking such relief must establish bona fide conduct and sufficient cause, as the law of limitation is intended to ensure diligence, finality, and the orderly administration of justice. The pertinent observation reads a