247 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH ARB-411-2025 Date of decision: 17.11.2025 MONIKA NARANG AND ANOTHER ...Petitioner(s)

VERSUS DAKSHIN HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM AND ANOTHER ...Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI Present:- Mr. Gaurav Arora, Advocate for the petitioners.

Mr. Prince Singh, Advocate for the respondents.

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JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11 (6, 7, 8) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), seeking appointment of an independent Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes and differences which have arisen between the parties pertaining to a lease deed entered into between the parties.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was a lease deed between the petitioners and the respondents, whereby the premises of the petitioners were given on rent to the respondents and the aforesaid lease deed (Annexure P-1) was duly executed and signed by all the parties. He further submitted that Clause No.5(a) of the aforesaid lease deed contains a valid arbitration clause, which provides that in case of any dispute, difference or claim arising out of or in connection with the agreement, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chief Engineer (Op.), DHBVN, Delhi. He further submitted that so far as the aforesaid nomination of the person is concerned, the same is per se not permissible in view of the law laid laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and another versus HSCC (India) Limited, (2020) 20 SCC 760. He further submitted that be that as it may, there is no dispute that the aforesaid arbitration clause exists and since a dispute had arisen between the parties, the petitioners served a notice invoking the aforesaid arbitration clause vide Annexure P-7 dated 01.07.2024 but the respondents failed to respond to the same and therefore, the present petition has been filed seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the lease deed is of the year 2009 and the respondents have vacated the premises in the year 2015 and there has been a delay in filing the present petition. He further submitted that considering the delay, this Court may not appoint a Sole Arbitrator in the present case. With regard to the existence of the lease deed and the arbitration clause itself, he submitted that there is no dispute with regard to the same. He further submitted that so far as the issuance of notice vide Annexure P-7 is concerned, the same is also not in dispute but the only objection raised by the respondents is that there has been a delay in invoking the aforesaid arbitration clause.

4. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

5. The lease deed (Annexure P-1) between the parties and existence of the arbitration clause are not in dispute. The service of notice dated 01.07.2024 (Annexure P-7) for invoking the arbitration clause is also not in dispute. The present petition has been filed under Section 11 of the Act on 21.06.2025 and is therefore within the period of limitation of three years. The law with regard to starting point of the cause of action for filing of the petition under Section 11 of the Act is now well settled. Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 held that the period of limitation of three years will commence upon the issuance of a notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.’s case (Supra) is reproduced as under:-

“127. In Arif Azim (supra), while deciding an application for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, two issues had arisen for our consideration:

i. Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to an application for appointment of arbitr