IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Reserved on: 09.12.2025 Date of decision: 15.12.2025 Uploaded on: 18.12.2025 STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS ..Appellants Versus RAMESHWAR DAYAL ..Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA Present: Mr. Harish Nain, AAG, Haryana.

Mr. Prashant Singh Chauhan, Advocate Ms. Manita Dalla, Advocate Mr. Rahul Sangwan, Advocate for respondent No.1.

SUDEEPTI SHARMA, J. (Oral)

The present appeal has been filed against judgment and decree dated 07.04.2016 with delay of 1907 days in filing the appeal.

CM-10929-C-2023

1. The present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 CPC is filed for condonation of delay of 1907 days in filing the appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant contends that delay of 1907 days in filing the present appeal is not intentional but procedural. He further contends that the matter was sent to the District Attorney for his opinion, which was received on 04.05.2016 stating it to be not a fit case to file appeal.

Thereafter, office of Legal Remembrancer also agreed with the same.

Thereafter, Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Haryana, Panchkula requested the higher authority for filing reply and the reason for delay of 1907 days in filing the present appeal is due to wrong advice given by the District Attorney. He, therefore, prays that since the delay is procedural due to departmental formalities and not intentional and the same be condoned.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the applicants-appellants at length and, with his able assistance, carefully perused the whole file of this case.

3. Before examining the merits of the present application, it is pertinent to note the settled position that delay is not to be condoned as a matter of generosity or benevolence; the pursuit of substantial justice cannot come at the cost of prejudice to the opposite party.

4. It is well settled by catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the law of limitation is not a mere technicality but has substantive value, being founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 seeks to ensure that litigants approach the Court within a reasonable period and do not sleep over their rights. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers the Court to condone delay upon sufficient cause being shown, such discretion is neither automatic nor to be exercised as a matter of course. Reference at this stage can be made to judgment of Apex court in Maniben Devraj Shah v Muncipal corporation of Brigham Mumbai 2012(5) SCC

157,wherein it is held as under :

“The law of limitation is founded on public policy.

The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."

5. Similarly, in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 363, Hon’ble the Supreme Court reiterated that a liberal or justice-oriented approach cannot be invoked to override the substantive law of limitation. The Apex Court observed that expressions such as “liberal approach” and “substantial justice” cannot be stretched to obliterate the mandate of limitation prescribed by statute.

6. More recently, in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 INSC 672, Hon’ble the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, reaffirmed that although Courts may lean in favour of advancing substantial justice, such indulgence cannot be extended unless the applicant establishes a legally sufficient and satisfactorily explained cause for the delay. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduce as