IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of Decision: 02.02.2026 Amarpreet Singh Ghuman …Petitioner Versus State of Punjab and others …Respondents CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL Present: - Mr. G.P.S. Ghuman, Advocate and Mr. G.S. Ghuman, Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Aman Dhir, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab ***

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)

1. The petitioner through instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of order dated 20.11.2017 whereby his counter-request for appointment to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police instead of Inspector was rejected.

2. The petitioner was appointed as Probationary Inspector on 21.10.2001 on compassionate grounds. Both of his parents died in a brutal terrorist attack on 27.12.1990 when he was 11 years old. He approached departmental authorities claiming post of Deputy Superintendent of Police which vide order dated 20.11.2017 rejected his claim. He has filed mercy petition before Director General of Police, Punjab. There are similarly situated employees who were granted better or more benefits on account of their parent’s sacrifice.

3. The impugned order was passed in November’ 2017 and instant petition has been filed in January’ 2026. The petitioner has approached this Court after 8 years from the date of cause of action, if any.

4. On being asked reason of delay, learned counsel for the petitioner could not advance any plausible reason for inordinate delay in approaching this Court.

5. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event, the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where illegality is manifest, it cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. State cannot deprive vested right because of a non-deliberate delay.

6. A two Judge Bench of Supreme Court recently in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 has held that High Court ought to dismiss petition on the ground of delay and laches where there is no explanation of delay. An applicant who approaches the Court belatedly or in the other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by writ Courts. Delay defeats equity. High Court may refuse to invoke its writ jurisdiction if laxity on the part of applicant has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. Multiple communications cannot create cause of action. The relevant extracts of the judgment are reproduced as below:

“9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been nonsuited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or latches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.

10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution.