IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
GAJE SINGH – Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. – Respondent
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
208 CWP-32850-2018 (O&M)
Decided on : 05.02.2026
GAJE SINGH
...Petitioner
Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. . . . Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS SURI
PRESENT: Mr. Rajesh Khandelwal, Advocate for
Mr. Ankur Sidhar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Paul S. Saini, Senior Panel Counsel
for respondents No. 1 to 3.
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HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI , J. (Oral)
1. In the present petition, the challenge is to the order dated
24.08.2018 (Annexure P-1) passed by the respondent No. 4- Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh (herein after referred to as ‘the
Tribunal’) by which, the claim being raised by the petitioner with regard to
the grant of benefit of regular pay scale when he worked on temporary basis,
has been denied to him on the ground that the petitioner cannot raise the said
claim before the Court after a period of three decades from the time when
actual cause of action accrued to him and that their claims are vague.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the benefit is being
claimed by the petitioner on the ground that the certain other similarly
situated person approached the Tribunal in the year 2001, claiming the said
benefit of regular pay scale by filing of OA No. 788/HR/2001 titled as
Pardeep Jain and others versus Union of India and others (Annexure A-1
colly) which benefit was allowed in favour of them on 31.10.2003. Hence,
the petitioner is also entitled to the said benefit, even if, the petitioner never
RIYA
2026.02.10 14:06
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integrity of this document
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CWP-32850-2018 (O&M)
claimed the same even after the order passed in OA No. 788/HR/2001 -
Pardeep Jain’s case (supra) , which had attained finality.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the denial
of the benefit to the petitioner on the ground that there was a delay in
approaching the authorities, is incorrect on the part of the Tribunal especially
when such benefit had already been granted to the other similarly situated
employees in Pardeep Jain’s case (supra)
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the case file with their able assistance.
5. It may be noticed that there are certain provisions under the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (herein after referred to as ‘Act, 1985’)
which are to be kept in mind for deciding the issue in hand, especially
Section 21 of the Act, 1985 which deals with the limitation for raising the
grievances. As per the Section 21 of the Act, 1985, the remedy has to be
filed within the period of one year from the date when the cause of action
has actually accrues, wherein any written order is causing prejudice and in
case, a direction is being sought for, for the removal of the grievance, the
same has to be interpreted to be the period of one year six months as six
months time is given to raise such kind of grievances by way of a
representation.
6. In the present case, the claim for the regular pay scale for a
period starting from the year 1982 is being claimed by the petitioner in the
year 2014. The First question which arises is whether, the said claim of the
petitioner can be entertained after a period of 32 years or not.
7. In this regard the definition of Section 21 of the Act, 1985 is as
under:_
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integrity of this document
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CWP-32850-2018 (O&M)
“21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an
application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is
mentioned in clause(a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been
made in connection with the grievance unless the application is
made, within one year from the date on which such final order
has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is
mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been
made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without
such final order having been made, within one year from the
date of expiry of the said period of si