IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision :01.04.2026 ASHA BAJAJ AND OTHERS ... APPELLANTS VERSUS AMRIK SINGH AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARMOD GOYAL Present: Mr. R.K. Choudhary, Advocate for Mr. Sukhdeep Parmar, Advocate for the appellants.

Mr. Amit Singla, Advocate for respondent No. 2.

Mr. Aseem Aggarwal, Advocate and Mr. Sandeep Suri, Advocate for respondent No. 3-Insurance Company.

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PARMOD GOYAL, J. (ORAL)

1. The appellants-claimants are aggrieved by the award dated 08.10.2004 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Panipat (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) vide which appellants-claimants were found entitled to total compensation of Rs. 2,73,700/-.

2. The claimants-appellants had sought compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’), asserting that deceased Satish Bajaj died on 09.03.2003 as a result of motor vehicular accident dated 09.03.2003. That the accident had occurred when motorcycle bearing registration No. HR-06-H-5718, on which the deceased was travelling, it was hit by a truck bearing registration No. RJ-13-G-5626, allegedly driven rashly and negligently by respondent No. 1.

3. Learned Tribunal assessed income of the deceased as Rs. 40,000/- per annum, as the claimants-appellants had restricted their claim to that extent during the pendency of the claim petition. One-third of the income was deducted towards personal expenses of the deceased. Considering that the deceased was aged between 40 to 45 years of age as per the postmortem report, a multiplier of 10 was applied. Consequently, a total compensation of Rs.2,73,700/- was awarded on account of loss of dependency, along with an additional amount of Rs.7,000/- towards last rites.

4. The claimants-appellants have challenged the said award on the ground that the learned Tribunal erred in applying a multiplier of 10 instead of ‘15’, as specified in the second schedule of the Act. Although the claimants- appellants contended that deduction towards personal expenses should be one- fourth, keeping in view the number of dependents i.e. four, however, since the second schedule prescribes deduction of one-third towards personal expenses, no deviation from the said schedule can be made by Court. Accordingly, the deduction of one-third towards personal expenses is upheld.

5. Learned counsel for the claimants-appellants has also sought addition of future prospects. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that no provision for future prospects in petition under Section 163-A of the Act exists in the second schedule and, therefore, the claimants-appellants are not entitled to the same.

6. However, on consideration, I find that the concept of future prospects has been evolved by the Courts through judicial precedents. Even under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was initially no specific provision for grant of future prospects, and the same came to be recognized subsequently to ensure just and fair compensation.

7. The Motor Vehicles Act, being a beneficial legislation, requires the Court to determine just and reasonable compensation payable to the claimants- appellants. In cases under Section 163-A of the Act, compensation is to be assessed on the basis of the structured formula provided in the second schedule of the Act. Therefore, where the Second Schedule specifically prescribes parameters such as maximum income, deduction towards personal expenses, and the applicable multiplier, the same must ordinarily be adhered to and be not deviated from.

8. However, the Second Schedule does not expressly deal with the aspect of future prospects. In order to arrive at just and fair compensation, it would be appropriate to extend the benefit of future prospects even in cases under Section 163-A of the Act. The underlying principle for determination of compensation under Sections 163-A and 166 of the Act remains broadly similar, i