IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Jaswinder Singh ....Applicant versus State of Punjab and another ....Respondents Date of Decision: February 12, 2026 Date of Uploading: February 12, 2026 CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL Present: Mr. Ivan Singh Khosa, Advocate for the applicant.

Mr. Adhiraj Singh Thind, AAG Punjab.

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SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)

The application CRM-22756-2025) has been filed on behalf of the applicant/petitioner seeking condonation of delay of 129 days in filing the application seeking leave to appeal. The application seeking leave to appeal has been filed impugning the judgment dated 25.09.2024 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, whereby, the appeal filed by respondent No.2 – accused, namely Yasin Mohd. against the judgment and order dated 10.11.2016 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ludhiana, in criminal complaint case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’), was allowed, thereby, setting aside the judgment and order dated 10.11.2016 and acquitting respondent No.2 from the notice service under Section 138 of the NI Act.

2. Learned counsel for the applicant, while seeking grant of prayer for condonation of delay of 129 days, has iterated that the delay has occurred due to lack of sufficient funds to avail services of an Advocate to contest case on his behalf. Learned counsel for the applicant has further argued that the circumstances of the case indicate that the delay in filing the instant application seeking leave to appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate & hence delay deserves to be condoned.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and have perused the paper-book.

4. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of this Court passed in CRR(F)-1844-2023 titled as Deepak vs. Noori and another, decided on 29.02.2024; relevant whereof reads as under:

“8. As a sequel to above-said discussion, the following principles of law emerge:

(I) A liberal approach, undoubtedly, ought to be accorded to a plea for condonation of delay made under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 so as to further the cause of substantial justice. The concept of substantial justice essentially includes in itself the desirability of adjudication of a claim of the litigant on merits thereof rather than rejection of the same, at the threshold, on account of being barred by limitation. However, adoption of such liberal approach cannot be stretched to mean that a prayer (for condonation of delay) ought to be granted sans reasonable explanation therefor. An applicant (seeking condonation of delay) has to bring forward cogent, credible and lucid reason(s) to substantiate such a plea. In case such reason(s) is not scrutable, a Court would well be within its discretion to decline such plea (for condonation of delay). In other words, inexplicable delay ought not to be condoned.

(II) A Court ought to grant an application seeking condonation of delay when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to such applicant and/or such delay has occurred on account of circumstances beyond reasonable control of such applicant.

(III) It is not the length of delay (sought to be condoned) but explanation thereof which is relevant for consideration by a Court.

(IV) Law of limitation does not require an applicant (seeking condonation of delay) to furnish an exhaustive explanation on ‘day to-day basis’ for such delay. A Court while dealing with a plea for condonation of delay need not undertake such a pedantic approach.

(V) In appropriate cases, a Court may consider imposing costs while granting an application for condonation of delay. However, the quantification of costs so imposed, must reflect the same being commensurate to the lis in issue as also attending circumstances therein.

(VI) The factum; of non-applicant(s) or even strangers having altered their position(s) relying upon the applicant not having filed an appeal/revision etc. within sti