IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH Date of decision: 27.03.2026 M/s Devil Truss through its partner Arvind Kumar …….Applicant Versus SS Consultants and Designers and Anr.

….Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU, CHIEF JUSTICE Present: Mr. Ankur Dua, Advocate, for the applicant.

Mr. Arun Kumar Gupta, Advocate, for Mr. Rakesh Gupta, Advocate, for respondent(s).

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SHEEL NAGU, CHIEF JUSTICE

1. Instant application u/s 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘1996 Act’), seeks appointment of Sole Arbitrator.

2. Reply filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is taken on record and perused.

3. The rival parties herein entered into agreement dated 06.10.2023 (Annexure P-1) containing an arbitration clause as follows :

32. Arbitration: In case of any dispute, it shall be resolved by a Sole Arbitrator. The Sole Arbitrator shall be appointed by the CMD, Devil Truss The award of the Sole Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both parties. The place/seat of Jurisdiction shall be at Rohtak. The Courts at Rohtak shall alone have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings including any proceeding arising out of or incidental to the arbitration proceedings.

3.1 Dispute erupted between the parties. The applicant served notice dated 27.03.2025 (Annexure P-2) upon respondents seeking resolution of dispute through Arbitral Tribunal, but to no avail.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents could not dispute the existence and execution of arbitration agreement, exhaustion of remedy by applicant under the arbitration clause in the agreement between rival parties, service of notice, dispute between the parties being arbitrable and the cause not being a deadwood.

5. The law on the scope of examination u/s 11 (6) of 1996 Act is well settled. The Apex Court in Vidya Drolia Vs. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 (para 154.2, 154.3 and 154.4) held that the Court may undertake a prima facie examination at this stage and reject an application where it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable. In this context, the relevant extract of the said judgment is as follows :-

“154.2 Scope of judicial review and jurisdiction of the Court under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act is identical but extremely limited and restricted.

154.3 The general rule and principle, in view of the legislative mandate clear from Act 3 of 2016 and Act 33 of 2019, and the principle of severability and competence-competence, is that the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of non- arbitrability. The court has been conferred power of “second look” on aspects of non-arbitrability post the award in terms of sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Section 34 (2) (a) or sub clause (i) of Section 34 (2) (b) of the Arbitration Act.

154.4 Rarely as a demurrer the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non existent, invalid or the disputes are non-arbitrable, though the nature and facet of non-arbitrability would, to some extent, determine the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably “non arbitrable” and to cut off the deadwood. The court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability are plainly arguable; when consideration in summary proceedings would be insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are contested; when the party opposing arbitration adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.”

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