2026 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 77617
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CM-25282-CII-2025 in/and FAO-7044-2025
Date of Decision: 07.05.2026
ASHOK KUMAR JINDAL AND ORS ...Applicant-Appellants
Versus
BHAGWAN DASS AND ANR ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL
Present: Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Aggarwal, Advocate and
Mr. Ojas Bansal, Advocate for the applicant-appellants (through hybrid mode).
Ms. Ruchika Sabherwal, Sr. DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Varun Gupta, DAG, Haryana.
VIKRAM AGGARWAL, J. (ORAL)
CM-25282-CII-2025
This is an application instituted under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 315 days in filing the appeal.
It has been averred that after having obtained a certified copy of the impugned order, the applicant-appellants engaged learned counsel for filing the appeal, but since learned counsel was in the process of shifting his office from Chandigarh to Panchkula, the file was misplaced by the Clerk of learned counsel. It has been averred that despite best efforts, the file could not be located. Ten days prior to the filing of the appeal, the said file was retrieved from the record of old decided cases where, it had mistakenly been kept.
It has been averred that under the circumstances, a delay of 315 days occurred in filing of the appeal.
Heard.
Learned counsel for the applicants-appellants submits that on account of the file of the case having been tagged with old decided cases, the delay of 315 days in filing the appeal occurred which was unintentional and bona fide. Learned counsel submits that under the circumstances, sufficient cause for the delay having been shown, the same be condoned.
Keeping in view the peculiar facts, as mentioned in the application, which is accompanied by an affidavit of the Clerk of learned counsel and the submissions made by learned counsel, the instant application is allowed and the delay of 315 days in filing the appeal is condoned.
FAO-7044-2025
The instant appeal assails the order dated 01.10.2024 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Panipat, vide which the petition preferred by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1996 Act’) against arbitral award dated 22.07.2022 was dismissed.
2. A partnership deed (Annexure A-1) was executed between the appellants (Ashok Kumar Jindal and Smt. Shelly Katyal) and respondent No.1 (Bhagwan Dass) on 11.07.2007 to run the business of transport under the name and style of M/s Punjab Transport Company. A new partnership deed is stated to have been executed on 30.10.2015 (Annexure A-2) upon certain disputes having arisen between the parties. In the said deed, it was agreed that the liability of respondent No.1 would only be with regard to ongoing work orders/contracts taken till 01.06.2015 and he would have no concern with future liabilities.
3. Yet another partnership deed dated 22.08.2016 (Annexure A-3) was executed followed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 01.09.2016 (Annexure A-4). Respondent No.1 retired from the firm, whereas the appellants continued the partnership business by admitting two new partners, namely Pawan Kumar Katyal and Ashok Kumar Jindal.
4. A dispute arose between the parties as regards liability of the retiring partner and his rights. Certain litigation ensued. Finally, respondent No.1 instituted a petition under Section 11 of the 1996 Act in the High Court, pursuant to which, vide order dated 24.02.2021 (Annexure P-7), an Arbitrator was appointed.
5. Pursuant to the same, a claim petition (Annexure A-9) was instituted by respondent No.1 before the Arbitrator. Paragraphs 5 and the prayer clause in the said petition read as under:-
“5. That it is pertinent to mention here that at the time, as per the calculation of the firm, security/bank guarantee, amounting to Rs.27,00,000/- and Rs.42,93,000/- was lying with IOCL, PTPS and RGTPP, Hisar. Similarly, some liabilities were also alleged against the partnership firm i.e. by service tax department in the shape of notice and three cases were also pending against the firm before Motor Accident claims Tribunal. Hence it was decided between claimant and respondents that whatever amount is released from the security/bank guarantee lying with different department, after deducting the final amount paid by the firm, in lieu of the abovementioned liabilities (i.e. liabilities arisen upto 30.06.2016 against the firm with regard to