A summoning order must be a speaking order demonstrating the court's satisfaction of a prima-facie case. Furthermore, the limitation period for Insecticides Act prosecutions begins from the date the Public Analyst's report is received, not the date of sampling.

MANDEEP PANNU, J

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of Complaint No. COMA/37/2017 dated 04.08.2017 (Annexure P-13) under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 read with Section 27(5) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom, including the summoning order dated 04.08.2017 (Annexure P-14), vide which the petitioners have been summoned to face trial before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malerkotla.

2. The impugned order dated 04.08.2017 (Annexure P-14) has been passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malerkotla, whereby the petitioners/accused have been summoned to face trial in the complaint filed under the provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968 and the Rules framed thereunder.

3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the present complaint is not maintainable and is liable to be quashed. It is submitted that the complaint has been filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay and is hopelessly barred by limitation. The sample in question was allegedly drawn on 21.09.2011 and the report of the Analyst was prepared on 19.10.2011 and received shortly thereafter. Even the re-analysis report was received in last week of June 2012, however, no steps were taken by the respondent for a considerable period and sanction for prosecution was sought only on 06.01.2014 and granted on 03.07.2014, whereas the complaint came to be filed only on 04.08.2017, i.e. after more than six years from the date of analysis report. It is thus argued that in view of Section 468 Cr.P.C., the complaint is clearly time barred. It is further contended that the limitation for filing the complaint is to be reckoned from the date of receipt of the Public Analyst report and not from the date of sampling, and reliance has been placed upon judicial precedents to contend that delayed filing of the complaint vitiates the prosecution. It is also submitted that the re-analysis conducted at the instance of the accused cannot extend the period of limitation. It is also argued that the mandatory provisions of the Insecticides Act have not been complied with, inasmuch as the sample became unfit for analysis due to lapse of time and the petitioners have been deprived of their valuable right to have the sample tested through the Court. It is further contended that there is no specific averment in the complaint as to how the petitioners were responsible for the alleged offence, particularly petitioner No. 2, who is stated to be a non-executive Director and not responsible for day-to-day affairs of the company, and thus cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 33 of the Act. Still further, it is contended that no proper sanction as required under Section 31 of the Act has been accorded, as there has been no application of mind by the sanctioning authority and even the reply submitted by the petitioners was not considered. It is also submitted that no show cause notice was served upon the petitioners and the procedure adopted by the Insecticide Inspector was contrary to law, including non- joining of independent witnesses and non-compliance of statutory requirements while drawing the sample. It is thus prayed that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the complaint as well as the summoning order are liable to be quashed.

4. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the present petition