VIKRAM AGGARWAL, J. (ORAL)

This is defendants’ appeal against the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2019 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, whereby the appeal filed by the defendants against the judgment and decree dated 07.05.2018 passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jalandhar, was dismissed.

The appeal is accompanied by an application (CM-6340-C-2026) filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of 2469 days’ delay in filing the appeal.

It has been mentioned in the said application that the applicants-appellants, being laymen were not aware of their right to prefer an appeal. Still further, it has been averred that due to lack of funds, the applicants-appellants could not engage a counsel. Reference has also been made to the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 08.03.2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020 IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION.

Learned counsel representing the applicants-appellants, while reiterating the averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay, argues that the delay of 2469 days in filing the appeal, is neither intentional nor willful and rather, the same is due to the circumstances explained above. It is further argued that it is settled law that matters should not be rejected on technicalities and rather, the same should be decided on merits.

I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the applicants-appellants, but find the same to be devoid of merit.

As per Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if sufficient cause is shown for not preferring an appeal or an application (other than an application under the provisions of Order XXI CPC) within the prescribed period, the same may be admitted after the prescribed period as well. It is by now well settled that the Courts have to adopt a liberal approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay. It is also well settled that normally, parties should be heard on merits and should not be non suited on technicalities. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, 2013 (4) RCR (Civil) 785, the Hon’ble Apex Court culled out the principles with regard to condonation of delay. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-

“From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to en-capsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a libera