suffered by Khazan in favour of defendants No.1 to 6 (sons of another son of Khazan) was illegal, collusive and not binding upon their rights.

4. The defendants resisted the suit by pleading that the plain"ffs had separated from Khazan as far back as 1955–56 and had been given land and residen"al houses at that "me, and therea(er had no concern with the family. It was further contended that Khazan was competent to deal with the property and that the decree dated 24.02.1977 was valid. The suit was also stated to be barred by limita"on.

5. The learned trial Court, on apprecia"ng the evidence led by the par"es, decreed the suit holding the property to be coparcenary and the impugned decree to be not binding. However, the learned First Appellate Court reversed these findings and dismissed the suit upon re-apprecia"on of evidence.

6. Assailing the reversal, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the First Appellate Court erred in law in holding that the property was not coparcenary, in accep"ng the plea of prior separa"on, and in rejec"ng the challenge to the decree dated 24.02.1977. It is further submi4ed that the suit was within limita"on.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned judgment.

8. This Court has considered the rival submissions and examined the record.

9. The main issue in the present case is whether the plain"ffs have been able to establish that the suit property was ancestral coparcenary property in the hands of Khazan so as to confer upon them a right upon them by birth.

10. It is well se4led that under Mitakshara law, for a property to be treated as ancestral coparcenary property, it must be shown to have descended from a male ancestor up to three genera"ons above the holder, and that such descent must be traceable through inheritance. The burden to establish such ancestral character lies upon the party asser"ng it.

11. In the present case, the plain"ffs have sought to trace the origin of the property from Ram Rakh to Khazan and therea(er to themselves. However, the evidence on record reveals that Ram Rakh had inherited the property from his father Kurria, but there is no evidence whatsoever as to how Kurria had acquired the said property. In the absence of proof that Kurria himself had inherited the property from his father or that the property had descended through the requisite ancestral line, the chain necessary to establish the ancestral character of the property stands broken.

12. In such circumstances, the property cannot be presumed to be ancestral merely because it passed from Ram Rakh to Khazan. It is equally well se4led that no presump"on of coparcenary property arises merely from inheritance. The plain"ffs were required to establish that the property retained its ancestral character in the hands of Khazan, which they have failed to do.

13. Once this principal requirement is not sa"sfied, the inevitable consequence is that the property must be treated as the separate property of Khazan, or at least not proved to be coparcenary. In that eventuality, the plain"ffs cannot claim any right by birth in the same.

14. Even otherwise, the First Appellate Court has recorded a finding, on the basis of evidence, that the plain"ffs had separated from Khazan several decades prior to the ins"tu"on of the suit and had been provided land and residen"al houses at that "me. It is se4led law that par""on in a Hindu joint family can be oral and need not necessarily be reflected in revenue record. The conduct of the par"es and long-standing separate possession are relevant factors. The finding of prior separa"on, being based on apprecia"on of evidence, cannot be said to be perverse.

15. Once the plain"ffs are held to have separated, and the property is not proved to be coparcenary, the competence of Khazan to deal with the property cannot be ques"oned.

16. The challenge to the decree dated 24.02.1977 is founded on allega"ons of fraud and collusion. However, no cogent evidence has been